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ABSTRACT 
This thesis seeks to provide an overview and examination of the thought of 
the significant contemporary sociologist, Peter L. Berger. Berger is 
concerned with the issue of how meaning is constructed in modern, secular, 
bureaucratic society. Furthermore, this thesis seeks to outline, and trace 
the development of, Berger's thought. To achieve this the thesis examines 
Berger's use of the disciplines of the sociology of knowledge and religion, 
along with contemporary studies in religion and theology. 
Berger, by linking the function of a theodicy with that of making meaning, 
allows for theodicies to be conceived of in the broader context of making 
meaning in contemporary society. As such, a contemporary theodicy needs 
to include (indeed, it needs to be inclusive, rather than exclusive) such 
factors as the relationship between self, others, the world, and the 
transcendent so as to provide some basis for an authentic and meaningful 
existence. There is a need for a more inclusive theodicy (other than the 
traditional individualistic type) which has hermeneutic concern for the 
'whole' (wholeness of self, wholeness in relationships with others, wholeness 
with the world/environment, and wholeness with the transcendent). 
However, this 'wholeness' will not be provided by over-arching, public, 
structures or systems; it will need to be through chosen, private means 
which reflect the Post-Modernist situation where 'closure' on a grand scale 
is unobtainable (Marshall, 1992, pp. 192 -193). Berger's work provides the 
possibility for this legitimation of a theodicy (or theodicies) which will 
provide meaning in Post-Enlightenment society. 
The construction of meaning in contemporary society neells an ability to 
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cope with complexity, it needs to be reasonable, as well as contemporary (to 
cope with the plurality in modern society), and it is on the way (that is, not 
given to closure). Therefore any contemporary theodicy, or system of 
meaning, must be able to be historically concerned (that is, conscious of its 
origins and open to the future), empirical (that is, open to scrutiny and 
review), inductive (that is, dealing with concrete reality, not abstract 
theory), and concerned with people's lived experience. Berger's signals of 
transcendence allow for the legitimation of this private, deinstitutionalized 
religion; that is, they legitimate a meaningful theodicy for contemporary 
humanity. This theodicy, which is able to accommodate the wider view 
current in modern society provided by the ecological movement, interaction 
between the various religious traditions, the feminist movement, the reality 
of multi-culturalism, and the resulting pluralism from the above factors, 
can provide some basis for a meaningful and authentic existence in 
contemporary society. The signals of transcendence are able to correlate 
people's lived experience (their 'natural reality') to a reality which is "in, with 
and under" that natural reality (Berger, 1992, p. 155). 
5 
DECLARATION 
I certify that this thesis does not incorporate without acknowledgement 
any material previously submitted for a degree or diploma in any institution 
of higher education; and that to the best of my knowledge and belief it does 
not contain any material previously published or written by another person 
except where due reference is made in the text. 
Signature .. 
Date ... c·j··:J.: .. '..: ... : .. :'.\:7 
6 
;._ 
,'.I 1,/ 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
' 
" 
The author of this thesis gratefully acknowledges the assistance of: Dr. 
Martin Wiltshire in the formulation of this thesis. Dr. Wiltshire has been a 
constant source of helpful criticism, advice, and friendship. Associate 
Professor Cynthia Dixon helped to clarify the topic of the thesis in its early 
stages. Dr. Iain Gardner supervised the final stages of the preparation of 
this thesis while Dr. Wiltshire was on leave. Dr. Gardner's help is greatly 
appreciated. My wife, Mrs. Helen Collins, provided an unending sow·ce of 
encouragement and advice throughout the duration of this exercise, without 
which this thesis would never have been completed. 
7 
CHAPI'ER I: INTRODUCTION 
This thesis is a description and outline of the thought of the significant 
contemporary sociologist, Peter L. Berger. Berger is concerned with the 
issue of how meaning is constructed in modern, secular, bureaucratic 
society. This thesis seeks to outline, and trace the development of, Berger's 
thought. 
Wuthnow, Hunter, Bergesen, and Kurzweil (1984, p. 22) suggest that 
Berger displays a deep "concern with the problems of meaning in a culture 
being transformed by the seemingly inexorable forces of modernization." 
Indeed, Berger claims that "Men are congenitally compelled to impose a 
meaningful order upon reality." (Berger, 1967, p. 22). The construction of 
meaning is one of the primary requirements of each individual and of society 
as a whole. "Ifwe hope to live not just from moment to moment, but in true 
consciousness of our existence, then our greatest need and most difficult 
achievement is to find meaning in our lives." (Bettelheim, 1982, p. 3). 
Modern, industrialized society has undergone many significant changes 
which affect the ability of the individual to construct meaning because the 
means by which society inculcated meaning in traditional societies have 
either gone or have been altered considerably (Beckford, 1989, p. 169). 
Berger contends that due to the influences of secularization (Berger, 1967, 
p. 107) and, more importantly, pluralism (Berger, 1967, pp. 135 - 137), 
members of contemporary Western society are forced to choose between 
competing systems of meaning (Berger, 1963, p. 68), and that because of 
this necessity to choose meaning is able to be constructed (Berger, 1992, 
pp. 87 - 89). 
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Berger's analysis of the contemporary situation involves a thorough 
overview of many thinkers and intellectual movements. To achieve this 
Berger attempts to address this contemporary situation by analyzing "the 
essential elements of the whole. It is not clear whether the few who attempt 
[this] ... are wise or foolish. Certainly some do a more convincing job than 
others. Berger as a generalist is plainly one of those whose performance is 
brilliant. His undertaking has been ambitious and energetic in the sense 
that he attempts to cover an immense span of intellectual territory." 
(Wuthnow, in Wuthnow,Hunter,Bergesen, and Kurzweil, 1984, p. 71). 
To highlight the 'immense span of intellectual territory' which Berger does 
cover this thesis describes, and traces the development of, Berger's 
thought. The thesis also seeks to outline and describe Berger's analysis of 
contemporary society, particularly with reference to what aspects of 
religious meaning are compatible with modernity (that is, Berger's signals of 
transcendence; infra uide, pp. 74 • 88). 
This description and tracing of the development of Berger's thought occurs 
in the three main chapters of the thesis: 
In Chapter Two ('The Background to Berger's Thought') the various 
influences apparent upon Berger's thought are discussed (infra ui.de, pp. 16 
• 31); 
Chapter Three ('Review of Berger's Works on Religion and the Construction 
of Meaning'), along with Chapter Four, forms the heart of the thesis, and 
discusses Berger's four central literary works (infra uide, pp. 32 · 88); and 
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Chapter Four provides 'An Examination of the Central Themes in Berger's 
Work?(infravide, pp. 89 -116). 
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Qm;mization of the Thesis: 
The Abstract provides a brief discussion of the purpose of the thesis. 
Chapter One provides an Introduction to the thesis which also includes an 
overview of the Organization of the Thesis, the Statement of the Problem, 
and discussion of the Methodology used in the thesis. 
Chapter Two presents a discussion on The Background to Berger's 
Thought, and attempts to demonstrete the various influences apparent 
upon Berger's thought. 
Chapter Three consists of the Review of Berger's Works on Religion and the 
Construction of Meaning, and is particularly concerned with the four central 
works of Berger in so far as these works provide the main corpus of Berger's 
enormous output. The discussion here develops the main themes in Berger's 
work, and also highlights the influences apparent upon Berger's work as 
outlined in Chapter Two. This chapter, along with Chapter Four, forms the 
heart of the thesis. 
Chapter Four provides An Examination of the Central Themes in Berger's 
Work, and is an attempt to examine and outline four core areas of Berger's 
work which may be identified from Chapter Three; namely: Berger's 
methodology; Berger's discussion of secularization and pluralism; Berger's 
ethical and political position; and Berger's discussion of religious meaning 
and modernity. 
Chapter Five provides a Conclusion to the thesis. It seeks to offer some 
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general discussion on Berger's work. 
Toe Glossary provides definitions and some discussion of the central ideas, 
movements, and characters refe1Ted to in the thesis. 
The Bibliography lists the central works of Berger referred to in the thesis, 
and also lists works which provide discussion on the issues dealt with in the 
thesis. 
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Statement of the Problem: 
Contemporary Western society has undergone !Ilany changes to the way it 
is ordered and how people live witlrin that society over the past fifty to one 
hundred years. Beckford (1989, p. 169) details many of these changes 
which Berger, through bis sociological analysis of contemporary society, 
distils to two essential changes or influences; these being: secularization 
(Berger, 1967, p. 107) and pluralism (Berger, 1967, pp. 135 - 137). 
Given these changes in contemporary society the ways in which meaning 
is, or the ways in which theodicies are, constructed has changed too. Berger 
links the function oftheodicies in contemporary society with that of making 
meaning. Therefore, in spite of the collapse of traditional theodicies Berger 
maintains that religion still has a place to play in human culture. This 
thesis describes and outlines the ways in which Berger explores what 
aspects of religious meaning are compatihle with modernity. This is the 
problem oflegitimating a theodicy in Post-Enlightenment society. 
This examination of the ways in which Berger explores what aspects of 
religious meaning are compatible with modernity is achieved by describing, 
and tracing the development of, Berger's thought. 
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Methodology: 
Peter Berger has, over the course of more than thirty years, written an 
enormous amount of material. Some of the themes which he developed 
early on in his writings have remained influential throughout the course of 
his (ongoing) career, whereas other themes which Berger set forth in !ris 
writings early on in his career he either modified, adapted, or changed 
altogether in his later writings. Therefore, this thesis is essentially a 
description and outline of Berger's thought and work. The thesis also traces 
the development of Berger's thought and work. The thesis is descriptive in 
that the description, outline, and tracing of the development of Berger's 
thought and work is reliant upon the evidence offered in Berger's main 
literary works (so that Chapter Three, dealing as it does with Berger's four 
main literary works, along with Chapter Four, forms the heart of the 
thesis). The thesis examines Berger's use of the disciplines of the sociology 
of knowledge =d religfon, along with contemporary studies in religion and 
theology. 
Berger smploys a phenomenological, empirical, and descriptive methodology 
and, as such, the methodology of this thesis is similar to, and dependent 
npon, Berger's methodology. Berger is vitally concerned with the lived 
experience of humanity. His work is phenomenological and empirical "in the 
sense that it is concerned with human experience in everyday life. Its task 
is (most generally) to describe human experience as it is lived and not as it 
is theorized about - to acc'<Junt for social reality from the point of view of the 
act.ors involved." (Wuthnow, in Wuthnow, Hunter, Bergesen, and Kurzweil, 
1984, p. 73). 
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For Berger, as a sociologist and a Christian, the choice of this methodology 
has taken the form of a 'vocation,' (Berger, 1992, p. 190) in so far as he 
achieves a congruency between his life, his profession, and the methodology 
which he employs within that profession. 
15 
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CHAPTERil:THE BACKGROUND TO BERGER'S THOUGHT 
Peter Berger was born in Vienna between World War I ami World War IT in 
the year 1929. His birth at this period of world history, witnessing in 
particular the phenomenon of Nazism and the response of the church in 
Germany to Hitler's political regime, seems to have bad a profound 
influence upon Berger. The religious convictions held by Berger as a result 
of his location at this point in history were profoundly influenced by N eo· 
Orthodox Christianity. 
The person at the centre of the Nao-Orthodox movement was Karl Barth 
(1886 • 1968). Barth read Kierkegaard, along with the Bible and Luther and 
Calvin, and crune to believe that God was on a completely different plane 
from human thought; that there is an 'infinite qualitative distinction' 
between humanity and God. This 'distinction' is nowhere more evident than 
in the wars which had so ravaged the world. Barth maintained that all the 
efforts humanity makes to reach God lead nowhere. Humans have to 
acknowledge that they have no strength in themselves, and then they will 
be able to hear what God is saying to them. In 1918 Barth produced the 
first version of his Commentary on Romans, in wh'.ch he showed how Paul 
' had heard something of God's Word, and, although his own unden.--tanding 
and his words were totally inadequate, because he and his thought forms 
were captive to his own particular situation, yet, fur all that, the letter did 
speak the Word of God, bringing a communication from the Wholly Other, 
the Transcendent God (therefore Neo-Orthodox Christianity was also 
known as'theologyofthe Word'). 
Barth believed it was impossible to find any adequate theological categories, 
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but yet affirmed that it was essential to preach the gospel. He ref ised to 
claim any superiority in human terms for Jesus or for Christianity, but 
claimed very strongly that it was here that God chose to be revealed. Many 
of his followers thought this meant that he was calling them to a faith 
expressed in Existentialist terms, but this, too, he rejected, as just replacing 
one philosophical framework with another. For the rest of his life he was 
trying to work out in his Chw·ch Dogmatics how hwnanity can understand 
what God has reveruc~, while rejecting all of humanity's efforts to reach up 
and understand God alone and apart from God's revelation. 
In his early days Barth tended to denigrate humanity, because so much 
trust had been placed in human powers. But once it was clear that in his 
teaching all power and grace came from God he was ready to point strongly 
to th.a Incarnation, to the fact that the Word of God took humanity upon 
Himself, to show the value that God gave to the hwnan. Barth never set 
limits on God's grace, believing in the possibility of salvation for all, but also 
acknowledging the terrible power of evil which stands in the way of that 
hope. For central to his theology is God's judgement, that 'krisis' under 
which humanity falls whenever it tries to work out its destiny in its own 
strength (therefore, Neo-Orthodox Christianity was also known as 'theology 
of crisis'). Every human being and every human institution, even, or 
perhaps especially, the church, always stands under this judgement, which 
is why it is called the theology of crisis (crisis, in the sense of judgement or 
choice). It is also called dialectical theology, not in the Hegelian sense of 
moving from thesis through antithesis to synthesis, but because there is 
always both a yes and a no said to every theological statement. No human 
language can contain God's truth, so that, for example, if we say that God 
was revealed in Jesus Christ, we must also say that God was hidden there 
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because of the limitations of Jesus' humanity. 
In the 1930's many German theologians and the vast majority of 
Protestant Christians saw Hitl~r as the hope of the nation, and, following 
the pattern of Christendom, adapted the life of the church to the changing 
patterns of Germany. Barth and a group of others rejected this line, formed 
themselves into the Confessing Church, and formulated the Barmen 
Decla,ation in 1934. The Confessing Church stood against Nazism because 
it saw it as being blasphemous. It claimed to contain the whole truth, 
leaving no place for God's "No." This provided the test case fo,; much 
theology, and led to a creative reassessment of the role of the church over 
against the world and its patterns of thought. 
Dietrich Bonhoeffer (1906 • 45) was deeply involved in the Confessing 
Church, and decided to return to Germany from the U.S.A when war came 
so that he could stand with his people against Nazism. Imprisoned in 1943 
for his part in the plot against Hitler he continued his theological work, 
showing immense creativity. He was particularly concerned to work out the 
implicatious of the end of that Christendom situation in which most of the 
problems had been tackled in a theological framework, and in which religion 
was primarily seen as a search for personal salvation. He believed we need 
to find what he called a "religionless Christianity," that is, in these terms, a 
Christianity that is lived in the world and focuses on obedience to God, 
rather than a religion which is a search for personal salvation. The language 
of "religionless Christianity" became common ir, some quarters, often with 
a meaning very different from Bonhoeffer's. But large sections of the church 
have taken seriously his intention, which was part of the growing stress on 
the Incarnation as a real Incarnation, in. which the humanity of Jesus is 
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taken as seriously as His divinity (a theology from 'below' as opposed to 
'above'). Bonhoeffer offers "a kind of theological counterpart to Freud's 
criticism of immature religion, for the special religious corner is needed only 
by those who have not become adult in their faith. Understood in this way, 
Bonhoeffer's critique of religion is entirely acceptable." (Macquarrie, 1977, 
pp.157 - 8). 
Thus in his three years' work at his gthics, Bonhoeffer begau with 
the idea of the amplitude of Christ's lordship; then that of conformity 
with Christ became central; thirdly, he brought the world as 
penultimate under justification; and finally, he reasoned from 
incarnation to historical responsibility. Each line of approach 
deepened the two aspects - a more resolute Christ-centredness, and 
a more realistic openness to the world. (Bethge, 1967, p.625). 
These two aspects - Christ-centredness and openness to the world - are 
central to an understanding of Bonhoeffer's theology. This is most clearly 
stated in the section of his Ethics entitled "Thinking in Terms of Two 
Spheres." Here Bonhoeffer says that 
Since the beginnings of Christiun ethics after the times of the New 
Testament the main underlying conception in ethical thought, 8lld 
the one which consciously or unconsciously has determined its whole 
course, has been the conception of a juxtaposition and conflict of two 
spheres, the one divine, holy, supernatural, and Christian, and the 
other worldly, profane, natural, and un-Christian. .. It may be difficult 
to break the spell of this thinking in terms of two spheres, but it is 
nevertheless quite certain that it is in profound contradiction to the 
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thought of the Bible and to the thought of the Reformation, and that 
consequently it aims wide of reality. There are not two ,ealities, but 
only one reality, and that is the reality of God, which has become 
manifest in Christ in the reality of the world ... Ther1; are, therefore, 
not two spheres, but only one sphere of the realization of Christ, in 
which the reality of God and the reality of the world are united. 
(Bonhoeffer, 1963, pp. 196 - 7). 
Christianity is indeed rooted in and concerned with the ultimate; but before 
the ultimate comes the penultimate, before the last things comes the next 
to last things, and these are the every day social and ethical concerns of 
humanity. 
Reality is no longer devalued (as by idealists) or revalued (as by 
positivists). 'To be in Christ' means to share in the world. Good, 
therefore, is not an abstraction but a process, movement, constantly 
accepting the world and people and taking part in their life; and so 
ethics is helping people 'to share in life,' it is the Christlike in the 
midst of the human. Christ sets up no foreign rule: the 
'commandment of Jesus Christ ... sets creation free for the fulfilment 
of the law which is its own.' Christ 'eads, not beyond, but right into 
the reality of everyday life. Christian life is no end in itself, but puts 
one in a position to live as a man before God, not to become a 
superman, buttoexist'forothermen.'(Bethge, 1967, p. 624). 
This is, perhaps, the reason why Bonhoeffer will best be remembered. That, 
above all else, he was a man for others. Bonhoeffer's charismatic appeal 
explains, in some way, the influence which he had upon the development of 
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post-war theology. Bonhoetfer had a concern to work out the implications of 
the place of Christianity in the context of humanity having "come of age." 
The place of theology within this context led to the clevelopment of'secular' 
theologies to somehow reconcile the Christian faith with the influence of 
secularization and modernity. These secular theologies led, in turn, to the 
notorious 'death of God' theologies on the one hand and also to the various 
'liberation' theologies on the other. The development of these various 
theologies can be seen as reactions to the influence of secularization, 
modernity and the continuing phenomenon of totalitarian regimes ofth., left; 
and of the right around the world (Berger, 1969, pp. 11 · 13). 
These influences of secularization, modernity and totalitarian regimes (or, 
in a broader sense, the relationship between church and politics) which 
provided the source of much which Nao-Orthodox theologians wrote about 
are also strong influences upon the writings of Peter L. Berger. In his early 
book The Precarious Vision (1961 b), which was influenced (even if 
unconsciously) by Neo-Orthodox understandings, Berger drew a distinction 
between "religion" and "Christian Faith." Berger later revoked this position, 
writing in The Sacred Canopy (1967, pp. 179 · 185) that this distinction 
was an artificial one based upon methodological fallacies. Berger's later 
concern, which was hinted at in Appendix II of The Sacred Canopy 
(Sociological and Theological Perspectiues, pp. 179 - 185), to confront the 
historical relativity of religion and to take seriously the concept of religion 
being a human product or projection and then to search for "discuveries" ( as 
opposed to "revelations") within these projections for what he termed 
"signals of transcendence" became a reality with the publication of A 
fumour of Angels (1969 ). 
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As mentioned above the influence ofN eo-Orthodoxy on Berger's work, both 
in a positive affirmation and in a negative refutal, is evident in his published 
works. This, and other influences, may be traced through the corpus of 
Berger's work like the themes of a fugue ore woven together into a work of 
musical composition. Sometimes one aspect of the theme is dominant, then 
another. So with Berger's work there are themes, such as Neo-Orthodoxy, 
which appear early on, but then are re-worked into other forms and then 
appear again to complement the 'composition' in its entirety. It is only by 
viewing the corpus as a whole, and how themes have developed over time in 
Berger's writings, that a sense of the art of Berger's work becomes 
apparent. 
Another theme which Berger skilfully weaves into his writings includes a 
deep commitment to preserving the dignity and worth of humanity. Berger's 
humanistic concern (Berger, 1963, pp. 186 - 199) is grounded in a 
. 
Kantian/phenomenological epistemology. Kant (1724 - 1804) drew a 
distinction between 'Phenomena' (that which can be perceived) and 
'Noumena' (that which is beyond perception; "things in themselves"). 
Berger's concern, which stems from the intellectual environment of 
rationalism and scepticism inherited from the distinction made by Kant, 
dovetails neatly with the method of inquiry which he employs in his 
sociological investigations. Berger's methodology is empirical in that it deals 
with the lived experience of people (itis a pre-theoretical, inductive, 'bottom-
up' approach). Berger is eclectic in his sources and does not let 
'methodological purity' become an obstacle to addressing what actually 'is.' 
Berger's sociological concern ( which is coloured, as mentioned above, by his 
theological concern; particnlarly as influenced by Bonhoeffer) is to create a 
tolerant and even compassionate society (Berger, 1963, pp. 183 ·· 185). This 
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concern for humanity led Berger to become interested in such political 
concerns as Third World development and modernization (Berger, 1969, pp. 
x • xi). Here again it is possible to detect the influence of Bonhoelfer upon 
Berger as issues of religion in contemporary society impinge upon political 
concerns. That is, to borrow from Bonhoeffer's terminology, whilst beinig 
concerned with 'ultimate' reality, Berger is compelled to address issues of 
'penultimate' reality for this is the reality of everyday life. 
Another influence upon Berger, particularly in his earlier works, is that of 
Existentialism (Berger, 1963, pp. 159 • 183). From Existentialism Berger 
gains a perspective on religion that requires of religion that it possess an 
ability to cope with complexity, that it is reasonable, as well as 
contemporary, that it is comprehensive and can cope with plurality, and 
that it is 'on the way' and in dialogue with, and cognizant of, the modern 
world as opposed to being fixed, absolutist, triumphalistic, and immutable 
(again, Berger is more concerned with "discoveries" as opposed to fixed 
"revelations"). Furthermore, Berger's humanistic concern and the influence 
of Existentialism compel him to adopt a methodology which is historically 
concerned, empirical, inductive, and concerned with lived experience. Above 
all else the Existentialist concern for authenticity further compels Berger to 
address issues of'proto-typical' concern, that is the issues of everyday li,red 
existence, so that the existent may make choices which do not lead to 'bad 
faith,' but bring personal (and social) freedom. 
Phenomenology provides a significant methodological tool for Berger. Berger 
,' adopts ( 11nd adapts) this methodology from the sociologist Alfred Schutz 
(1899 - 1959) who was concerned to explore the 'world-taken-for-granted.' 
This is the self evident world of the 'here-and-now' which demands ones 
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immediate attention. Phenomenology, as employed by Berger, requires the 
'bracketing' of personal preferences and prejudices so as to be able to 
investigate the "doings of men." (Berger, 1963, p. 29). Phenomenology refers 
to the 'study of phenomena;' the study of what appears or what may be 
observed (similar to Kant's 'Phenomena;' infra vide, p. 26). The use of 
phenomenology requires that the investigator utilizes academic discipline 
and imaginative empathy. This requires the investigator to make an 
attempt to appropriate and und11rstand what a particular phenomenon 
might involve for those people who are directly engaged with it. 
Phenomenology is a kind of thinking which guides the investigator back 
from theoretical abstraction to the reality of the lived experience. A 
phenomenologist asks the question "what is it like to have a certain 
experience?" In examining the qualities of the experience the investigator 
can then arrive at the essence of the experience. The phenomenological 
method is an inductive, descriptive research method. The task of the 
method is to investigate and describe all phenomena, including the human 
experience, in the way these phenomena appear in their fullest breadth and 
depth. To ensure that the phenomenon is investigated as it truly appears a 
necessary criterion is that the researcher must approach the subject and 
the experienr;e with an open mind, accepting whatever data are given with 
no pre-conceived e"P"ctations. No data are ignored because of conflicts with 
theoretical frameworks or operational definitions. The concern of the 
phenomenological researcher is to understand both the cognitive subjective 
perspective of the person who bas the experience and the effect that 
perspective has on the lived experience of that individual. (Kentish, 1992, 
pp. 42 • 48). 
Given Berger's Existential/phenomenological methodology he is, 
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nonetheless, also concerned with society too, and therefore his work is of 
hermeneutic significance in that he draws (implicitly, at least) on the notion 
of'Verstehen' (Berger, 1963, p. 146). Verstehen implies an understanding 
by one of the 'other.' Verstehen, like phenomenology, seeks to understand 
the meaning of an other's actions. Actions in themselves may prove 
ambiguous to an observer; unless the observer gains understanding of the 
meaning of an action then the observer is unable to fully appreciate the 
'other' (person or society). 
Berger (and Thomas Luckmann in The Social Construction of Reality:) 
combines phenomenology along with the sociology of knowledge in his two 
most influential works: The Social Construction of Reality (1966) and The 
Sacred Canopy (1967). The sociology of knowledge, derived as it is from the 
work cf Max Scheler, may be summed up in the statement that "Reality is 
socially constructed." (Berger, 1963, p. 136). Berger (and Luckmann) 
develop this thesis concerning the social construction of reality in a broad, 
all-encompassing way in The Social Construction of Reality, and then 
Berger applies the same methodological tools to the study of religion in The 
Sacred Canopy where Berger explores the historicity of religion given that 
religion is a social (human) construction, and also the subsequent socio-
historical relativity of all religion. 
The history of ideas provides Berger with an over-arching view of society 
and the (changing) role of religion in contemporary society. These changes 
in the way in which the world has been perceived include (following Roberts, 
1980, pp. 810 - 819; and Berger, 1969, pp. 33 - 36): First; the change in 
perspective as a result of Copernicus establishing that our universe has as 
its centre the sun (that is, it is 'heliocentric') and that the earth (as opposed 
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to the previously assumed position; for instance, by the use of such terms 
as "sunrise" and "sunset") was not the centre of the universe, but just one 
planet in just one galaxy set amongst innumerable other galaxies. Second; 
Rene Descartes' (1596 • 1650) maxim "Cogito, ergo sum" ("I think, 
therefore I run") provided another shift in perspective from a theocentric 
world to an anthropocentric one, where humanity stands at the centre. 
Third; Kant's distinction between 'Phenomena' (that which can be 
perceived) and 'Noumena' (that which is beyond perception; "things in 
themselves") led to a reduction of religion to morality. For instance, Kant's 
'Categorical Imperative' ("Act so that the maxim of thy will can always at 
the same time hold good as a principle of universal legislation.") tends 
towards an understanding of God where God becomes the condition for the 
possibility of humanity's moral autonomy. This whole shift in view from the 
Pre to the Post-Enlightenment is an enormous one. Though restricted to 
intellectuals initially, it became widespread in the Nineteenth Century 
through the means of the popular press and the new found power of the 
lower and middle classes. The metaphysical certainties of the Mediaeval 
world were gone (Jung, 1933, p. 204), <111d the process of secularization had 
begun in earnest. Along with this shift in 'mind-set' came a shift in politics 
too where the principles of'liberty, equality, and fraternity' heralded in the 
secular, democratic state as a political given. Fourth; the Darwinian theses 
of'Evolution' and 'Natural Selection' saw humanity's 'God-likeness' further 
shattered as humanity came to be seen as another creature suluect to the 
same physical and genetic laws as all other creatures, and indeed having 
been derived from and owing its origin to other creatures. Fifth; along with 
these other trends a growing historical consciousness of the development of 
society, religion, and of ideas and philosophy emerged. The Judeo-Christian 
tradition came to be seen as one amongst many, and the texts which had 
26 
largely legitimated this tradition came under close scrutiny which confirmed 
their hist.orical evolution and cultural setting. Hence the authority of the 
Bible and the church, and the traditional arguments for the existence of God 
came to be increasingly questioned and rejected. As modern, secular 
societies were developing under the influence of science, democracy, 
nationalism, and economic individualism religion failed t.o provide a coherent 
nomos (a coherent 'cement') given all these developments such as 
industrialization, scientific discovery, and rapid social change. This gave rise 
to the Romantic movement, and to the rise of English Literature which 
came to fill the emotional and experiential needs of people; that is, it 
provided a coherent nomos, a socially constructed reality relevant t.o the 
age (Eagleton, 1986, pp. 22 -23). Sixth; these critical studies of history, 
human r~ature, and culture gave rise to various 'Naturalistic' theories 
regarding the place of religion in society such as those forwarded by 
Fauerbach, Marx, and Freud. Feuerbach's 'projection' theory, and Marx's 
'opiate' assertion provided a natural springboard for Freud's 'illusion' 
hypothesis. What served most t.o popularize the psycho-analytic technique 
were the revolutionary, yet widely popular (at least in academic circles), 
naturalistic interpretations of existence and, in particular, religion. In both 
Civilization and Its Discontents and The Future of an Illusion Freud 
maintained that religion has no empirical support, that it was an interim 
social neurosis, providing security from the harshness of reality, and that it 
had outlived its use, and that humanity would grow out of it through 
education. As mentioned previously, this view of religion was not original t.o 
Freud, as both Feuerbach and Marx both offered their own naturalistic 
theories regarding the origin of religion. Finally; the sociology of knowledge 
maintains that the very heart of the world that humans create is socially 
constructed meaning (Berger, 1969, p. 33 ff.). Humans necessarily infus,, 
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their own meaning int.o reality. The individual attaches subjective meaning 
t.o all their actions. Given this social construction of reality Berger asserts 
that 
Religion thus serves to maintain the reality of that socially 
constructed world within which men exist in their everyday lives. Its 
legitimating power, however, has another important dimension· the 
integration of a comprehensive nomos of precisely those marginal 
situations in which everyday life is put in question. (Berger, 1967, p. 
42). 
These 'marginal situations' include: falling asleep/waking up and the 
transition period between them; dreams; disease; acute emotional 
disturbance; suffering; upheavals to the 'normal' order (for iI,stance, war, 
and natural disast.er); and death. Beq,er goes on to say that 
The implication of the rootage ofreligion in human activity is not 
that religion is always a dependent variable in the history of society, 
but rather that it derives its objective and subjective reality from 
human beings, who produce and reproduce it in their ongoing lives. 
(Berger, 1967, p. 48). 
This takes place through the three-fold process of Externalization: which 
involves the outpouring of human being into the world; Objectivation: where 
the product of externalization confront.s it.s original producers as a facticity 
external to and other than themselves; and Internalization: in which the 
structures of the externaVobjective world are transformed int.o structures of 
the subjective consciousness. 
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Therefore 
the point is that the same human activity that produces society 
also produces religion, with the relation between the two products 
always being a dialectical one. (Berger, 1967, p. 47). 
This socio-historical consciousness (along with the other influences upon his 
work) motivates Berger to enter into a dialogue with contemporary society. 
As a result of this dialogue Berger developed the notion of 'signals of 
transcendence.' These signals "point toward the reality beyond the 
ordinary." (Berger, 1969, p. x). Berger outlined these signals of 
transcendence in his book A Rumour of Angels (1969) which drew on, as its 
inspiration, the theology of such Liberal Protestant theologians as 
Schleiermacher who, in Berger's opinion, had the courage to use the tools of 
the social sciences, which had previously been employed by those 
antagonistic to the theological task, to construct an inductive theology. 
In The Heretical Imperative, Berger argues that, in the modern era, 
three different methodologies have been employed in an attempt to 
understand religious truth. The first, he terms 'deduction.' It involves 
reaffirmation of the authority of a religious tradition, in spite of the 
difficulties of doing so in the context of modem pluralism and within 
the assumptions of socio-historical relativism. An exemplar in the 
use of this method would be Karl Barth. He labels the second method 
'reduction' and considers the work of Rudolph Bultmann to fall into 
this category. Here, the religious tradition is reinterpreted via 
modern, secular categories in the hope of making aspects of the 
tradition meaningful to the modernist mind. The last method, 
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'induction,' involves an attempt to uncover and retrieve essential 
experiences embodied in the religious tradition. It is both empirical 
and comparative, in that it takes all religious experience seriously in 
its search for transcendent reality. Friedrich Schleiermacher 
achieves paradigmatic status relative to this approach. (Gaede, in 
Hnnter and Ainlay, 1986, p. 170). 
The various themes and influences appearing in Berger's works (such Neo-
Orthodoxy, Existentialism, phenomenology, the sociology of knowledge, 
socio-historical relativism, and his ongoing dialogue with contemporary 
society) enables him to achieve a synthesis of the Weberian and 
Durkheimian approaches to sociology (Berger, 1963, pp. 145 - 150). Put 
simply Durkheim's emphasis on the objective reality of society (which 
tended towards a functionalistic and positivistic approach which was very 
much in vogue in the United States of America when Berger began to 
investigate the social construction of reality and led to an impasse within 
the sociology of religion in that it dealt, on the whole, with such trivial issues 
as church attendance by using quantitative survey methods and did not 
explore the substantive issues raised by the socio-historical relativism of 
re'lgion) tended towards "sociological reification" (Berger, 1967, p. 187); 
whereas Weber's emphasis on the subjective reality of society tended 
towards "an idealistic distortion of the societal phenomenon." (Berger, 1967, 
p. 187). This synthesis achieved by Berger enabled him to address the 
substantive issues raised by the sociology of knowledge with respect to the 
socio-historical relativism of religion (Wuthnow, in Wuthnow, Hnnter, 
Bergesen, and Kurzweil, 1984, pp. 75 · 76). Whilst obviously being eclectic 
in his sources Berger, nonetheless, achieves an original approach to the 
sociology of religion in his attempt to 'transcendentalize secularity' (Berger, 
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1969, p. x) in his affirmation of the various signals of transcendence. 
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CHAPTERID:REVIEW OF BERGER'S WORKS ON 
REUGION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF MEANING 
This section seeks to outline and describe Berger's thought as evidenced in 
his written works, and, together with Chapter Four, forms the heart of the 
thesis. The discussion here develops the main themes in Berger's work, and 
also highlights the influences apparent upon Berger's work as outlined in 
Chapter Two. The examination of Berger's work is essentially chronological, 
and will focus on his three seminal works: (i) The Social Construction of 
Reality (with Thomas Luckmann) (1966); (ii) The Sacred Canopy (1967); 
and (iii) A Rumour of Angels (1969). The overview of Berger's thought, 
however, begins with an examination of Berger's popular introduction to the 
study of sociology: Invitation to Sociology ... A Humanistic Perspective 
(1963). In this early work, Berger sets forth some of the themes which he 
re-works and eXJ"lllds upon in his later works. 
Berger's latest work: A Far Glory; The Quest for Faith in an Age of 
Credulity (19s2) is not reviewed here; for it forms a central part of Chapter 
Four ('An Examination of the Central Themes in Berger's Work'), in that it 
highlights some of the ways in which Berger re-works and expands some of 
the themes he deals with in the works reviewed in this chapter; and in that 
it also highlights some developments in Berger's thought. 
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INVITATION TO SOCIOLOGY ... A Hun.,anistic Perspective (1963): 
Wuthnow, Hunter, Bergesen, and Kurzweil (1984, p. 22) suggest that 
Berger displays a deep "concern with the problems of meaning in a culture 
being transformed by the seemingly inexorable forces of modernization." In 
this introduction (or invitation) to sociology Berger attempts to address the 
issues surrounding the making of meaning in contemporary society (Berger, 
1963, p. 68). This concern which Berger displays in this, and all his other 
works, is largely motivated by his interest in religion (Berger, 1963, p. 8), 
which Berger sees as being one of the significant humanizing forces in the 
modern world (Berger, 1969, p. xiii). Berger's interest in the preservation of 
the human element within contemporary society in no way implies that he 
is 'soft' or theoretically unsound. Berger is one of the few academics who 
seem to be able to find congruency between their life, their profession, and 
the methodology employed within that profession. Berger is most familiar 
with the sociology of religion, yet in this introductory book be attempts to 
construct a schema for sociology as a whole. He begins by describing 
sociology as an individual pastime (Berger, 1963, pp. 11 • 36), as a field of 
inquiry with Existential implications, exhorting practitioners not to rely too 
heavily on the 'tyranny of technique' (statistics, or obscure jargon), but to 
bracket their preferences and prejudices (following phenomenology) in the 
spirit of 'value-free' (after Weber) scientific inquiry so as to be able 
investigate the "doings of men." (Berger, 1963, p. 29). Berger insists upon 
the methodological stringency of value-free inquiry so that the practitioner 
is able to be free to discover the unexpected and the different ways in which 
social interaction is perceived by different sectors of society (Berger, 1963, 
pp. 15, 28 ff.). This implies both the need for description, and the possibility 
of prescription. Berger can be both conservative and radical at the self 
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same time. Whilst seeing sociology as an individual pastime, Berger is 
adamant of the need for au undP.rstanding of history to be part of the 
sociological endeavour as well; for the descriptive role of the sociologist is, in 
many ways, similar to the role of the historian (Berger, 1963, p. 32). 
Berger then addresses the circumstances and historical setting in which 
sociology as a discipline was formulated (Berger, 1963, pp. 37 - 67). Berger 
claims that modern society emerged when "the normative structures of 
Christendom and later of the ancien regime were collapsing." (Berger, 1963, 
p. 42), and that the discipline of sociology developed in France after the 
Revolution (1789) against the background of the rapid transformation in 
society (Berger, 1963, p. 54). Whilst the attitude (the 'form of 
consciousness') necessary for sociological inquiry no doubt existed in former 
times, it would seem that sociology stems from a modern, Post-
Enlightenment world-view. The socio-historical consciousn,,.ss of the 
relativity of ail world views, and the extent to which rapid transfonnations 
take place within a society engenders an attitude of inquiry as to why 
things are as they are and why they are not otherwise (Berger, 1963, p. 62). 
The 'Classical' world-view held that fixed, immutable principles evidenced in 
the world gave rise to eternal, unchanging principles. Whereas the 
historically conscious world-view avoids this outlook of the classical world-
view which held t,hat there is "an unchanging body of clearly formulated 
precepts, based on a supposedly unchanging nature." (Macquarrie, 1977, p. 
506). With the decline in influence of the classical world-view a more 
sceptical and critical approach was taken to the investigation of such 
institutions as government, religious authority, the family, and society as a 
whole. Berger maintl!ins that sociology "is constituted by a peculiarly 
modem form of consciousness." (Berger, 1963, p. 37). Geographical and 
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social mobility meant that different world-views came into contact which 
results in sociological relativization (Berger, 1963, p. 62). This ability to 'see 
through things' (institutions, and the like) Berger terms 'debunking.' An 
example of debunking which Berger cites is Weber's analysis of the 
unintended outcomes of the Calvinist Reformation (The Protestant Ethic 
and the Spirit of Capitalism; Berger, 1963, pp. 51 -52). The capacity of 
sociology to provide alternative ways of looking at what are held to be 
norms is one of its great strengths accordine to Berger. Yet, along with this 
ability to see through things Berger would have the sociologist be aware of 
the need to maintain a broad and open mind on all aspects under inquiry so 
that sociology might also contribute to an understanding of society which 
enables people to be free and to live full human lives. For Berger there is a 
direct link between cynicism and compassion. By seeing things as they are 
one is freed from the naive belief in purely ideological statements. Berger 
maintains that the ability to act freely is dependent upon being able to 
perceive the ideological constraints of one's own world-view, and thereby 
then being able to understand, if not appreciate, the world-view of'others.' 
(Berger, 1963, pp. 130, 146, 183 - 185). 
This ability to see clearly; to perceiYe society as it is, enables sociology (or, 
more particularly, one who has sociological understanding or 
'consciousness') to make choices between varying and sometimes 
contradictory systems of meaning. That is, sociology (sociological 
consciousness) enables meaning to be made in the complex, contemporary, 
pluralistic situation of modern society (Berger, 1963, p 68). The social and 
geographical mobility inherent in contemporary society leads to a world-
view where there are no fixed points and no closure (Berger, 1963, p. 73). 
This world-view is essentially a Post-Enlightenment one, and may even be 
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considered to be a Post-Modem one. Modem society has moved from the 
Pre-Enlightenment, to >,he Enlightenment, to the Post-Enlightenment 
(modern), to the Post-Modern. The Post-Modern world-view is one which dis-
confirms ideology, particularly religious ideology (theodicy) in its traditional 
form due to the secularization and pluralization of society. Post-
Modernism's resistance to closure, rejection of absolute 'Truths,' empirical, 
anti-transcendental, questioning of 'metanarratives' derives from the view 
of the social construction of reality as provided by the sociology of 
knowledge. Nonetheless this world-view still values local and contingent 
truths. (Marshall, 1992, pp. 3 - 6, 18, 86, 157; Eagleton, 1986, pp. 22 - 23, 
60, 107). Post-Modernism corresponds to Berger's notion of the 'public' and 
the 'private' spheres. The public sphere is over-institutionalized (dealing as 
it does with such 'social' concepts as 'sincerity' and 'honour'), whereas the 
private sphere is under- (or de-) institutionalized (dealing as it does with 
more personal concepts as 'authenticity' and 'dignity') (Berger and 
Luckmann, 1966, p. 81). Value is still to be attributed to life; meaning is still 
to be sought from life (Marshall, 1992, p. 6); but the world-view 
('Weltanschauung') deriving from the influence of the sociology of knowledge 
is a sceptical one which is prepared to question authority and the 
propaganda which those in power purport to be (the) 'Truth.' Berger 
maintains that the sociology of knowledge enables one to view society with 
clear sigl.t (Berger, 1963, pp. 79, 128 -140). 
This scepticism is further required so that one is able to resist the definition 
of oneself which society imposes (Berger, 1963, pp. 83 - 109). In other 
words, society locates the individual (the world-taken-for-granted) through 
various mechanisms such as social control (where violence, economic 
constraints, ridicule, ostracism, popular social morality, and even one's 
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occupation and family may be employed by society to define and locate the 
individual within society) and social stratification (where the individual is 
ranked within society, and whereby power, privilege, and prestige are given 
to, or withheld from, the individual depending upon their particular social 
stratification). This social stratification and social control locates o; 
situates (the 'sitz im leben' ... 'situation in life') the individual within society. 
The various institutions within society such as family and occupation 
provide procedures through which human conduct is patterned. This gives 
to society a sense of objective reality :mch that, following Durkheim, society 
may be deemed to be 'there.' Or, as Berger pnts it "society is the walls of our 
imprisonment in history." (Berger, 1963, p. 109). The facticity, or 
'thereness,' of society further strengthens the view afforded by the sociology 
of knowledge that the 'world-taken-for-granted' is not the only way to 
perceive things (given that other societies view things differently), and that, 
because of this, scepticism is required so as to dis-believe ( or to 'dis-
confirm') the way in which society locates the individual, and to be freed 
from this limited view of self and of society (Berger, 1963, pp. 148 - 152). 
Having explored the objective nature of society (after Durkheim) as the 
'world-taken-for-granted' Berger tloen briefly overviews three methods of 
analyzing society which help to provide a more subjective view of society 
(after Weber). These three methodologies include: Role Theory which 
maintains that "Identity is socially bestowed, socially sustained, and 
socially transformed." (Berger, 1963, p. 116); the sociology of knowledge 
which maintains that ideas as well as humanity are socially located, and 
that reality is socially constructed. The sociology of knowledge is anti· 
idealistic in its tendency, and tends to ask the question "Says who?" 
(Berger, 1963, p. 129) of ideological assertions where a certain idea serves a 
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vested interest in society. When such an idea serves such a function it 
'legitimates' the social construction of reality, whereby the idea (ideology) 
attempts to explain, justify, and even sanctify (or reify) that particular 
social construction of reality. Religion may at times serve such a function 
when, for instance, 'virtues' such as humility and respect for authority, or 
patient suffering is extolled as a virtue in the face of unjust suffering, then 
these 'virtues' provide a legitimation of the political authority, or as the 
assuagement of social rebellion (what Weber terms the 'theodicy of 
suffering'). The use of religion (or any ideology) like this is possible in so far 
as the ideology which has been reified is then 'internalized' into the life of the 
~eliever, where the world 'out there' becomes the world 'in here.' (Berger, 
1963, p. 134). The third such methodology is Reference Group Theory which 
maintains that a reference group "is the collectivity whose opinions, 
convictions, and courses of action are decisive for the formation of our own 
opinions, convictions, and courses of action. The reference group provides us 
with a model with which we can continually compare ourselves." (Berger, 
1963. p. 137). Of these three methodologies it is the sociology of lmowledge 
which provides the greatest insight for Berger into the role and function of 
society. Berger later uses the sociology of knowledge as the theoretical 
hases for The Social Construction of Reality (1966) (co-authored with 
Thomas Ludemann), and again in The Sacred Canopy (1967). 
This tension between the objective reality of society, whereby society 
defines who we are and what we do, and the subjective reality of society, 
whereby we define society, means that society is, in fact, 'precarious.' That 
is "Since all social systems were creat.ed by men, it follows that men can 
also change them." (Berger, 1963, p. 149). This balance between social 
reification (objective social reality) and idealism (subjective social meaning) 
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allows for detachment from the world of original socialization and for the 
construction of alternative worlds. That is, humans, so Berger maintains, 
are free (Berger, 1963, pp. 149 - 171). This 'freedom' is unable to be proved 
(or dis-proved either) by empirical means; yet freedom, nonetheless, is an 
aspect of human existence and reality. Freedom is exercised daily through 
choice ('authentic existence'), or denied through the flight from choice 
('inauthentic existence'). Those who seek to be defined solely by the way in 
which society defines them exercise 'bad faith' because they refuse to act 
with individual responsibility. Obviously Berger makes use of the 
Existentialists (Sartre in particular) when he explores the area of freedom. 
For Berger freedom is an act of ecstasy; which for him means "stepping out, 
alone, to face the dark." (Berger, 1963. p. 171). 
Berger's methodology is eclectic in that it combines phenomenology(dealing 
with what 'is'), the sociology of knowledge, humanism, and Existentialism. 
In the spirit of'value-free' inquiry he brackets his Neo-Orthodox Christian 
beliefs, yet is still quite concerned with values, ethics, and morality (Berger, 
1963, pp. 188 - 199). 
The sociology of knowledge provides a clear sighted view of society by 
suggesting that all categories invested with 'ontological' significance are 
arbitrary, incomplete, and, most importantly, reversible. Therefore there is 
a need to take all socially assigned identities with a grain of salt, including 
one's own. Having this perspective, or understanding ('Verstehen'), of 
society allows for the place of compassion within society in that the 
individual is the.'1 able to recognize the freedom of the 'other.' (Berger, 1963, 
pp. 183 • 184). 
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It is this humanistic concern and understanding which, for Berger, provides 
the ultimate reason. for the continued pursuit of sociology as an academic 
discipline in the liberal tradition. "Unlike the puppets, we have the 
possibility of stopping in our movements, looking up and perceiving the 
machinery by which we have been moved. In this lies the first step towards 
freedom. And in this same act we find the conclusive justification of 
sociology as a humanistic discipline." (Berger, 1963, p. 199). 
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THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY ... A Treatise in the 
~ociology of Knowledge (with Thomas Luckmann) (1966): 
Berger and Luckmann begin this wol'k with a socio-historical overview of 
those people and those ideas which provide the theoretical substance and 
methodological justification for their endeavours in and with the sociology of 
knowledge. Indeed, "The present volume is intended as a systematic, 
theoretical treatise in the sociology of knowledge." (Berger and Luckmann, 
1966, p. v). To achieve this end Berger and Luckmann choose in an eclectic 
manner from those people and those ideas which they review so as to 
achieve a unique analysis of the sociology of knowledge and its concerns. 
Put simply, Berger and Luckmann contend that "the socwwgy of knowledge 
is concerned with the analysis of the social construction of reality." (Berger 
and Luckmann, 1966, p. 3). 
As with Berger's discussion of freedom in Invitation to Sociology (1963) here 
Berger and Luckm.ann insist on the every day, commonsense, usage of such 
terms as 'reality'· "a quality appertaining to phenomena that we recognize 
as having a being independent of our own volition (we cannot 'wish them 
away')." (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, p. 1); and 'knowledge'· "the certainty 
that phenomena are real and that they posses specific characteristics." 
(Berger and Luckmann, 1966, p. 1). Therefore, "The need for a 'sociology of 
knowledge' is thus already given with the observable differences between 
societies in terms of what is taken for granted as 'knowledge' in them." 
(Berger and Luckmann, 1966, p. 3). 
Wbilst the term 'Sociology of Knowledge' ('Wissenssoziologie') was coined by 
the philosopher Max Scheler in the 1920's, Berger and Luckmann suggest 
three other contributing factors in the development of the sociology of 
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knowledge. First is the work of Karl Marx from whom the sociology of 
knowledge derives its root proposition "that man's consciousness is 
determined by his social being." (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, p. 5). From 
Marx comes also such concepts as: ~deology' - "ideas serving as weapons for 
social interests."; 'false consciousness' - "thought that is alienated from the 
real social being of the thinker."; 'substructure' - "human activity."; and 
'superstructure' - "the world produced by that activity." (Berger and 
Luckmann, 1966, p. 6). Second, "one can say that the sociology of 
knowledge represents a specific application of what Nietzsche aptly called 
the 'art of mistrust.= (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, p. 7). The third factor 
Berger and Luckmann cite as being influential in the development of the 
sociology of knowledge is the development of historicism in which the 
"dominant theme here was an overarching sense of the relativity of all 
perspectives on human events, that is, of the inevitable historicity of 
human thought." (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, p. 7). 
This socio-historical relativistic world-view (or consciousness) is a Post-
Enlightenment one held mainly in Western societies largely because the 
factors leading to this secularized and rationalistic world-view are 
essentially Western in nature (factors such as: industrialization, 
technological development, the growth of complex economies and the 
prevalence of economic rationalism as the driving force of such economies, 
the need these economies have for highly trained personnel, and the 
development of highly organized, bureaucratic management structures). 
Given this mix of factors Western society has become secularized, 
rationalistic (in its economic processes), pluralistic, and modern (as opposed 
to 'traditional'). The insidious creeping of this economic model into the so-
called 'Third World' or 'Developing' economies (through the activities of the 
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World Bank and the International Monetary Fund) will probably see a 
similar process occur within those societies and economies which become 
more highly industrialized and whose economies become more closely linked 
to the 'world economy.' 
There is a parallel in the overall intention of Scheler's work and that of 
Berger (and Luckmann) in that Scheler sought "to throw a sizable sop to 
the dragon of relativity, but only so as to enter the castle of ontological 
certitude better." (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, p. 8). This intention, which 
Berger shares, is outlined by Berger in the Introduction to the 1990 edition 
of A Rumour of Angels (pp. ix - x) where he refers to his project of 
"relativizing the relativizers." This project (like Scheler's), of which The 
Social Construction of Reality is a part, involves showing "how the 
intellectual tools of the social sciences, which had contributed greatly to the 
loss of credibility of religion, could be turned on the very ideas that had 
discredited supernatural views of the world and on the people propagating 
those ideas." (Berger, 1969 [1990 edition], pp. ix- x). 
Whilst Berger's (and Luckmann's) concern in The Social Construction of 
Reality is essentially theoretical this theorizing is, however, related to the 
everyday, concrete concerns of humanity. Berger and Luckmann base the 
content of SECTION I ('The Foundations of Knowledge in Everyday Life') of 
their book on the work of the sociologist (and Berger's teacher) Alfred 
Schutz. Schutz "concentrated on the structure of the commonsense world 
of everyday life." (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, p. 16). Therefore, "The 
socwlogy of krwwledge must concern itself with everything that passes fbr 
'knowledge' in society." (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, pp. 14, 15). Berger and 
Luckmann explore the concepts of 'reality' and 'knowledge' as they are 
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taken in a commonsense way by "ordinary members of society." (Berger 
and Luckmann, 1966, p. 19). This task is essentially a descriptive one, 
relying as it does on "The phenomenological analysis of everyday life, or 
rather the subjective experience of everyday life" (Berger and Luckmann, 
1966, p. 20). This analysis "refrains from any causal or genetic hypotheses, 
as well as assertions about the ontological status of the phenomena 
analyzed." (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, p. 20). As part of this analysis 
Berger and Luckmann seek to schematize the reality of everyday life; this 
is, in part, their contribution to the theory of the sociology of knowledge. 
Within the world-taken-for-granted of everyday reality there are, in fact, 
multiple realities such as the transition between sleep and wakefulness. 
Berger (1967, pp. 22 - 23) later refers to these periods of transition as 
'marginal situations.' One may even be "transported to another world" 
through play (theatre or art or music or even religion and ritual; Berger and 
Luckmann, 1966, p. 25), or one may be required to use a different language 
as opposed to the everyday language when one tries "to report about 
theoretical, aesthetic or religious worlds of meaning." (Berger and 
Luckmann, 1966, p. 26). Berger (1969, p. 59 ff.) later refers to these 
phenomena as 'signals of transcendence.' These 'marginal situations' and 
'signals of transcendence' form a central part in Berger's attempt to 
'relativize the relativizers' (1969 [1990 edition], pp. ix- x). However, reality, 
in the normal. course of everyday reality, is objectivated. That is, reality has 
about it a givenness, which is paramount, and self-evident, and which is 
shared with others. Therefore, "there is an ongoing correspondence between 
my meanings and their meanings in this world, that we share a common 
sense about its reality." (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, p. 23). 
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Ainlay (in Hunter and Ainlay, 1986, pp. 43 • 46) summarizes Berger and 
Luckmann's foundations of knowledge in everyday life as: everyday reality 
is paramount; primacy is on the 'here and now;' the 'here and now' is usually 
defined in terms of standard time and space; everyday reality tends to be a 
highly pragmatic world; everyday ~eality demands our 'wide·awakeness,' 
that is, our full attention; we 'willingly suspend doubt' in everyday reality; 
and we compartmentalize everyday reality. 
An example of the objectivation which occurs in everyday reality is 
language. Language makes real, or proclaims, the subjective interiority of 
the one speaking. That language can be understood signifies the shared sign 
system of those who speak or understand that language; that is, those who 
share the everyday reality of the subject. However, within a language 
system other factors other than everyday (objective) reality manifest 
themselves. These factors, such as religmn, require a special language (and 
also a special understanding), as they seek to objectify very subjective 
experiences. Therefore, "language is pliantly expansive so as to allow me to 
objectify a great variety of experiences coming my way in the course of my 
life.• (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, p. 39). 
This objectivation available through language is a fundamental aspect of 
humanity's relationship to the external world. For "Unlike the other higher 
mammals, he has no species-specific environment ... man's relationship to 
his environment is characterized by world-openness." (Berger and 
Luckmann, 1966, p. 47). This 'world-openness' requires of the human 
organism an "immense plasticity in its response to the environmental 
forces at work on it." (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, p. 48). Berger and 
Luckmann suggest that this plasticity is an inherent aspect of what it is to 
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be human for "While it is possible to say that man has a nature, it is more 
significant to say that man constructs his own nature, or more simply, that 
man produces himself." (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, p. 49). This 'self-
production' leads to the production of an ordered, social world; for, as 
mentioned previously (supra vide, p. 44), Berger and Lucl,mann contend 
that there is a 'correspondence' between self and others in the process of 
the social construction of reality. Humanity, so Berger and Lucl!cmann 
contend, seeks always to create a stable external environment in the face 
of the 'plasticity' o.nd 'world-openness' of human nature which requires that 
humanity externalizes itself in such a way which leads to order and 
eventuates in institutionalization. (Berger and Lucl<mann, 1966, p. 52). 
It is here, at this point, when the collective externalization of humanity, 
which leads to institutionalization, that the objective reality of society 
takes on a givenness which becomes the world-taken-for-granted. For "All 
human activity is subject to habitualization." (Berger and Luclrmann, 
1966, p. 53). Institutions, with the givenness that they create, occur 
"whenever there is a reciprocal typification ofhabitualized actions by types 
of actors. Put differently, any such typification is an institution." (Berger 
and Lucltmann, 1966, p. 54). As an institution's givenness becomes tal<en-
for-granted it assumes a historicity and control of its own. (Berger and 
Luckmann, 1966, p. 54). As externalization leads to institutionalization, so 
habitualization leads to objectivation. "The process by which the 
externalized products of human activity attain a character of objectivity is 
objectivation." (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, p. 00). These two 'moments' 
( externalization and ohjectivation) are part of a three-fold dialectic that is 
at the heart of Berger and Luckmann's thesis concerning the social 
construction of reality; the clrird 'moment' being 'internalization.' Berger and 
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Luckmann maintain that esch of these dialectical 'moments' correspond to 
an essential aspect of the social world: 
Externalization - "Society is a human product." 
Objectivation - 'Society is an objective reality." 
Internalization - "Man is a social product." (Berger and 
Luckmann, 1966, p. 61). 
~/he institutional, social world requires legitimation so as to explain and 
justify itself to subsequent generations, or to newcomers to that society. 
This process occurs through socialization (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, p. 
61). A 'canopy' of legitimations surround the institutional order of society 
"stretching over it a protective cover of both cognitive and normative 
interpretation." (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, p. 62). Furthermore, these 
legitimations tend to be pre-theoretical in nature precisely because they 
deal with the shared reality of the commonsense, world-taken-for-granted 
knowledge of society. This pre-theoretical knowledge incorporates "the sum 
total of 'what everybody knows' about a social world, an assemblage of 
maxims, morals, proverbial nuggets of wisdom, values and beliefs, myths, 
and so forth." (Berger and Luck.mann, 1966, p. 65). 
This is the knowledge that is learned in the course of socialization 
and that mediates the internalization within individual consciousness 
of the objectivated structures of the social world. Knowledge, in this 
sense, is at the heart of the fundamental dialectic of society. It 
"programs" the channels in which externalization produces an 
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objective world. It objectifies this world through language and the 
cognitive apparatus based on language, that is, it orders it into 
oqiects to be apprehended as reality. It is internalized again as 
objectively valid truth in the course of socialization. Knowledge about 
society is thus a realization in the double sense of the word, in the 
sense of apprehending the ol6ectivated social reality, and in the 
sense of ongoingly producing this reality. (Berger and Luckmann, 
1966, p. 66). 
In the section of The Social Construction of Reality dealing with 'Society As 
Objective Reality' (following Durkheim), Berger and Lucl,mann describe 
society and institutionalization in such a way so as to mal<e them seem 
fixed and immutable in their nature and in the way they are manifested 
within the world-taken-for-granted. "Institutionalization is not, however, an 
irreversible process, despite the fact that institutions, once formed, have a 
tendency to persist. For a variety of historical reasons, the scope of 
institutionalized actions may diminish; deinstitutionalization may take 
place in certain areas of social life. For example, the private sphere that 
has emerged in modern industrial society is considerablydeinstitutionalized 
as compared to the public sphere." (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, p. 81). 
The emergence of this private sphere in modern industrialized societies 
swms, in large part, to be due primarily to the extent that that society 
moves from a traditional economic system (be it either agrarian, 
subsistence, or hunting and gathering) to an economy which enables the 
production of an economfo surplus. "In advanced industrial societies with 
their immense economic surplus allowing large numbers of individuals to 
devote themselves to even the obscurest pursuits, pluralistic competition 
between subuniverees of meaning of every conceivable sort becomes the 
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normal state of affairs." (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, p. 86). Therefore, as 
Berger discusses later in The Sacred Canopy (1967, pp. 131 • 149), the 
issue of competing truth claims and the search for meaning that is required 
so as to choose an authentic lifestyle in modem society (supra utde, p. 39), 
as opposed to the uncritical reception of a I:radition, is an issue which is 
relevant to modem, pluralistic, Post-Enlightenment, industrialized society. 
It remains to be said, though, that even within these various subuniverses 
of meaning all the various processes involved in legitimating that particular 
world·view, as opposed to other, competing, world·views, still operate. These 
processes, as mentioned above, are externalization, objectivation, and 
internalization. Within objectivation social reality may become reified. 
"Reification is the apprehension of human phenomena as if they were 
things, that is, in non-human or possibly supra-human terms." (Berger and 
Luckmann, 1966, p. 89). 
To further 'explain' and 'justify' itself beyond the level of 'first-order' 
objectivations of meaning society requires 'le~itimation.' "Legitimation as a 
process is best described as a 'second-order' objectivation of meaning ... The 
function oflegicimation is to make objectively available and subjectively 
plausible the 'first-order' objectivations that have been institutionalized." 
(Berger and Luckmann, 1966, p. 92). Legitimation is required to facilitate 
socialization from one generation to the next, for it is at this stage in society 
that the 'self-evident' nature of soci~ty, or of institutions, requires 
explanation and justification (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, p. 93). There 
are different levels of legitimation: firstly, there is self-evident, pre-
theoretical, knowledge; secondly, proverbs, moral maxims, and wise sayings 
develop as a folk-lore surrounding the pre-theoretical level oflegitimation; 
thirdly, as a 'professional' class of storytellers, or, more particularly, law-
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givers, develops, then explicit theories surrounding the folk-lore will evolve; 
the final level of legitimation is that of symbolic universes. "These are 
bodies of theoretical tradition that integrate different provinces of meaning 
and encompass the institutional order in a symbolic totality" (Berger and 
Luclcmann, 1966, pp. 94 • 95). 
This fourth level of legitimation, concerning the construction of symbolic 
universes, represents the farthest limit by which legitimation is able to 
provide an all encompassing system of meaning. This is achieved by being 
able to incorporate the subjective experiences of individuals into an overall 
order. "What is particularly important, the ma.ginal situations of the life of 
the individual (marginal, that is, in not being included in the reality of 
everyday existence in society) are also encompassed by the symbolic 
universe ... The symbolic univei:-se is, of coun?e1 constn~cted by means of 
social objectivations. Yet its meaning-bestowing capacity far exceeds the 
domain of social life, so that the individual may 'locate' himself within it 
even in his most solitary eXJ5eriences." (Berger and Ludemann, 1966, p. 96). 
This over~arching ordering (nomos), or canopy, of meaning provides a 
means by which the subjective apprehension of biographical experiences 
(both the world-taken-for-granted, and those marginal situations, death in 
particular, which fall outside the province of everyday lived experience) may 
be incorporated into an overarching nomos, whereby one may be born, live, 
and die 'correctly.' (Berger and Ludemann, 1966, pp. 97 • 104). 
The origins of a symbolic universe have their roots in the 
constitution of man. If man in society is a world-constructor, this is 
made possible by his constitutionally given world-openness, which 
already implies the conflict between order and chaos. Human 
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existence is, ab initio, an ongoing e.xt.emalization. As man 
ext.ernalizes himself, he constructs the world into which he 
ext.ernalizes himself. In the process of ext.ernalization, he projects his 
own meanings into reality. Symbolic universes, which proclaim that 
all reality is humanly meaningful and call upon the entire cosmos to 
signify the validity of human existence, constitute the farthest 
reaches of this projection. (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, p. 104). 
Therefore, in summary, symbolic universes supply a broader meaning to 
those who 'inhabit' that symbolic universe, in that events which make "no 
sense" (that is, events which fall outside the world-taken-for-granted) 
require a deeper meaning for those who experience that event. Events 
which call everyday reality into question (what Berger calls 'marginal 
situations') likewise require the construction of a symbolic universe so as to 
provide meaning for those who experience such events. Within a religious 
context theodicies provide such a symbolic universe, or sacred canopy, so 
as to provide a religious legitimation of such experiences as those which fall 
outside the world-taken-for-granted (infra ui.de, pp. 63 - 64). These socially 
constructed (through the dialectical process of externalization, 
objectivation, and internalization) symbolic universes give meaning to such 
marginal situations which fall outside everyday Jived experience by 
incorporating those experiences into a wider frame of reference through the 
inclusion of that experience within the symbolic universe. (Ainlay, in Hunter 
and Ainlay, 1986, pp. 43 - 46). 
Having considered the origins of symbolic universes, Berger and Luckmann 
then proceed to examine how such symbolic universes may be maintained. 
Given that such symbolic universes are precarious, and that the reality 
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which they represent as the 'Reality' (or the 'Truth') may be brought into 
question by competing truth claims from other over-arching symbolic 
universes, then it is necessary for those within a particular symbolic 
universe to maintain that symbolic universe as opposed to another. 
Various forms of universe-maintenance are available. 'Therapy' as a form 
of social control attempts to encourage acceptance of the institutional 
definition of reality, whereas 'nihilation' attempts to deny the reality of 
phenomena which do not fit within the co-ordinates of one's symbolic 
universe. (Berger and Luclonann, 1966, pp. 112 - 114). Symbolic universes 
may also be brought into question as societies move from a traditional 
framework, where mythology and theology maintain the symbolic universe 
of that. society, to a modern framework, where philosophy and science 
distance the process of universe-maintenance (legitimation) from the world-
taken-for-granted of the shared experience of the inhabitants of that 
society. This may lead to an anomic sense of meaninglessness and 
'homelessness' for those within that society. (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, 
pp. 110 - 112). Those with an interest in maintaining the established 
political power within society tend to have an affinity with those who 
·administer monopolistic traditions of universe-maintenance within society. 
"In other words, conservative political forces tend to support the 
monopolistic claims of the universal experts, whose monopolistic 
organizations in turn tend to be politically conservative." (Berger and 
Luckmann, 1966, p. 123). A,, mentioned previously (supra vide, p. 38) 
"When a particular definition of reality comes to be attached to a concrete 
power interest, it may be called an ideology." (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, 
p. 123). 
Religion is such a symbolic universe which provides what Berger calls a 
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'sacred canopy,' however this sacred canopy is open to empirical disM 
confirmation as contemporary people are alienated from the pre-existing 
sacred canopy because it does not address the reality of their lived 
experience (by such things as anomic forces, pluralism of competing truth 
claims, subjective secularization, the swing from 'public' to 'private' religious 
expression, and so on). These empirical dis-confirmations require a 
contemporary theodicy so as to provide meaning to modern people. This 
denting of the sacred canopy leads to a 'precarious vision,' and to a sense of 
anomic homelessness in contemporary society. 
Because of the changes within society brought about by the forces of 
modernity it is increasingly difficult for monopolistic claims of the universal 
experts to gain prominence over another group of universal experts from 
another symbolic universe because 
. It is important to bear in mind that most modern societies are 
pluralistic. This means that they have a shared core universe, taken 
for granted as such, and different partial universes coexisting in a 
state of mutual accommodation ... The pluralistic situation 
presupposes an urban society with a highly developed division of 
labour, a concomitant high differentiation in the social structure and 
high economic surplus ... The pluralistic situation goes with conditions 
of rapid social change, indeed pluralism itself is an accelerating factor 
precisely because it helps to undermine the change-resistant efficacy 
of the traditional definitions of reality. Pluralism encourages both 
skepticism and innovation and is thus inherently subversive of the 
taken-for-granted reality of the traditional status quo. (Berger and 
Luckmann, 1966, p. 125). 
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One of the creative aspects of Berger {in particular) and Luckmann's work 
is the synthesis they achieve between the pole,s of society as objective 
reality (after Durkheim) and society as subjective reality (after Weber). 
Part of this subjective reality is the process by which an individual comes to 
apprehend society 'out there' as society 'in here.' This subjective 
apprehension of society takes place through internalization; and through 
socialization in particular. 
The ontogenetic process by which this is brought, about is 
socialization, which may be defined as the comprehensive and 
consistent induction of an individual into the objective world of a 
society or a sector of it. Primary socialization is the first socialization 
an individual undergoes in childhood, through which he becomes a 
member of society. Secondary socialization is a'lJ' subsequent 
process that inducts an already socialized individual into new sectors 
of the objective world of his society. (Berger and Luclanann, 1966, p. 
130). 
Through the process of socialization the individual is given first, identity. 
The child learns that he is what he is called ... To be given an identity 
involves being assigned a specific place in the world ... Subjective 
appropriation of identity and subjective appropriation of the social 
world are merely different aspects of the same process of 
internalization, mediated by the same significant others. (Berger and 
Luckmann, 1966, p. 132). 
Second, through the process of socialization the individual is given meaning. 
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Primary socialization thus accomplishes what (in hindsight, of 
course) may be seen as the most important confidence trick that 
society plays on the individual • to make appear as necessity what is 
in fact a bundle of contingencies, and thus to make meaningful the 
accident of his birth. (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, p. 135). 
The third attribute given to the individual through socialization is order. 
In any case, the world of childhood is so constituted as to instill in the 
individual anomic structure in which he may have confidence 
that "everything is all right" • to repeat what is probably the most 
frequent sentence mothers say to their crying offspring.(Berger and 
Luckmann, 1966, p. 136; infra uide, pp. 82 · 83). 
To maintain the subjective reality as internalized from the objective reality 
of society through socialization it is necessary that society maintain its 
validity through such mechanisms as therapy and nihilation (supra uide, p. 
52). For the individual to maintain their subjective 'grasp on reality' it is 
important to retain proximity with like-minded others. 
One cannot remain a Muslim outside the umma of Islam, a 
Buddhist outside the sang ha, and probably not a Hindu anywhere 
outside India. Religion requires a religious community, and to live in a 
religious world requires affiliation with that community. The 
plausibility structures of religious conversion have been imitated by 
secular agencies of alternation. The best examples are in the areas of 
political indoctrination and psychotherapy. (Berger and Luckmann, 
1966, p.158). 
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The adage "extra ecc!esiam nulla salus." (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, p. 
158) implies that it is only possible to retain the plausibility of one's reality 
(subjective and objective) insofar as one remains in close proximity with 
others who share that reality. The socio-historical relativism of all symbolic 
universes challenges such tight definitions of reality, for then 'the world' 
becomes 'a world' set amongst others. (Berger and Lucl,mann, 1966, p. 
172). 
In The Social Construction of Reality (1966) Berger and Luclrmann provide 
an important re-evaluation of the sociology of knowledge with respect to its 
understanding of the social construction of reality. The issues they raise far 
exceed the boundaries of sociology alone ( they are concerned with all that 
passes as 'knowledge' within society) and, as such, their work is of great 
historical (with its use of the history of ideas) and philosophical (with its 
discussion of'reality') importance too. Their discussion of the relationship 
between objective and subjective aspects of society reconciles pre\<iously 
contrary view points. This dialectic is central to their understanding of 
society and of the place and role of humanity within society. "The point is 
that society sets limits to the organism, as the organism sets limits to 
society." (Berger and Lucl,mann, 1966, p.182). Whilst concerned at a 
theoretical level, it is, nonetheless, Berger and Luckmann's intention that 
the sociology of knowledge be relevant to the lived experience of humanity; 
and that it lead to a humanizing of sociological theory. 
'I"his object is society as part of the human world, made by men, 
inhabited by men, and, in turn, malring men, in an ongoing historical 
process. It is not the least fruit of humanistic sociology that it 
reawakens our wonder at this astonishing phenomenon. (Berger and 
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Luckmann, 1966, p. 189). 
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THE SACRED CANOPY ... Elements of a Sociological Them:v of 
Religion (1967): 
In The Sacred Canopy (1967) Berger applies "a general theoretical 
perspective derived from the sociology of knowledge to the phenomenon of 
religion." (Berger, 1967, p. v). This theoretical perspective is outlined by 
Berger, along with Thomas Luckmann, in The Social Construction of 
Reality (1966). Berger's contribution to the sociology of religion is unique, 
and, in fact, quite outstanding. For, in The Sacred Canopy, Berger. writing in 
his customarily clear and fluent way, demonstrates the relevance of the 
sociology of religion to the main stream of the discipline of sociology by 
locating the sociology of religion firmly within the orbit of the sociology of 
knowledge. This achievement is outstanding in so far as the sociology of 
religion has, on the whole, been peripheral to contemporary sociology and 
not been given the attention it deserves. As with Luckmann, Berger 
"criticized the taken-for-granted identification of religion exclusively with 
what happens in formal religious organizations; and he denied that rituals 
and doctrines exhausted the category of religious phenomena." (Bedford, 
1989, p. 102). Berger's eclectic, and unique, synthesis of Durkheimian, 
Weberian, Marxist, Schutzian, and Meadian theoretical perspectives 
enables him to demonstrate the relevance of the sociology of religion, 
utilizing the sociology of knowledge for its theoretical basis, to the 
contemporary discipline of sociology. This synthesis which Berger achieves, 
through a re-shaping of already existing material, results in "a unique way 
oflooking at the data of everyday life." (Wuthnow, in Wuthnow, Hunter, 
Bergesen, and Kurzweil, 1984, p. 73). 
As with Luckmann, Berger 
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has often been at pains to situate his work in the framework of a 
sociologyofknowledge which would go beyond the history of ideas and 
penetrate the central sociological question of how human beings are 
located in their social order. For both Berger and Ludemann, in fact, 
'the most important task' of the sociology of religion 'is to analyse the 
cognitive and normative apparatus by which a socially constituted 
universe (that is, 'knowledge' about it) is legitimated' (Berger and 
Luclonann, 1963, p. 424). (Beckford, 1989, p. 101). 
Berger's thesis in The Sacred Canopy relies heavily upon the theoretical 
framework which he developed in conjunction with Thomas Luckmann in 
The Social Construction of Reality. As a consequence Berger seeks "to push 
to the final sociological consequence an understanding of religion as a 
historical product." (Berger, 1967, p. vi). To achieve this end Berger utilizes 
the technique of phenomenological bracketing of truth claims, religious 
propositions about the world, and theology. (Berger, 1967, p. v). 
The first section of The Sacred Canopy (entitled 'Systematic Elements') 
relies heavily upon The Social Construction of Reality. yet also expands and 
elaborates upon the previous position, particularly wit:tt respect to the link 
between the sociology of knowledge and religion. 
The synthesis of Durkheim.ian (society as objective reality) and Weberian 
(society as subjective reality) view points achieved by Berger allows for a 
balance between the sociological reification of objective social reality and 
the idealism of subjecti...-e meanings. With reference to Berger's synthesis of 
Durkheimian and Weberian view points, Wuthnow maintains that 
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an exclusive emphasis upon subjective meanings leads to 
idealism; an emphasis on the objectivity of social reality leads to 
sociological reification. Both are distortions of social reality. These 
two he maintains, are correct only when seen together. (Wuthnow, 
in Wuthnow, Hunter, Bergesen, and Kurzweil, 1984, pp. 75 • 76). 
Berger goes on to say that "Society is a dialect;,c phenomenon in that it is a 
human product, and nothing but a human product, that yet continuously 
acts back upon its producer." (Berger, 1967, p. 3). This dialectic is at the 
heart of B(irger's thesis, and consists of three factors, or 'moments' as 
Berger calls them: 
Externalization - the outpouring of human being into the world. 
Objectivation - the product of externalization confronts its 
original producers as a facticity external to and other than themselves. 
Internalization - structures of the external/objective world are 
transformed into structures of the subjective consciousness. (Berger, 1967, 
p. 4). 
As mentioned previously (supra vide, pp. 38, 46, 52), because of the 
instability, or precariousness, of the natural environment, humanity seeks 
to order this environment so as to make it meaningful. This ordering 
involves the process of externalization, which in turn involves the other two 
'moments' in the three-fold dialectic of society; namely, objectivation and 
internalization. Therefore, "the socially constructed world is, above all, an 
ordering of experience. A meaningful order, a nomos, is imposed upon the 
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discrete experiences and meanings of individuals." (Berger, 1967, p. 19). 
Language plays a central role in ordering and interpreting experience. 
(Berger, 1967, p. 20). Given that this nomos is socially objectivated the 
'knowledge' which surrounds it tends to be 'pre·theoretical' in nature. 
(Berger, 1967, p. 21). It is this socially objectivated, pre-theoretical 
knowledge which is internalized in the course of socialization. (Berger, 1967, 
p. 21). Socialization may be considered to have 'succeeded' to the extent 
that the world-taken-for-granted becomes internalized into the life of the 
individual, and provides that individual with identity, meaning, and order. 
(Berger, 1967, p. 24; supra vide, pp. 54 · 55). "In other words, to live in the 
social world is to live an ordered and meaningful life. Society is the guardian 
of order and meaning not only objectively, but subjectively as well, in its 
structuring of individual consciousness. It is for this reason that radical 
separation from the social world, or anomy, constitutes such a powerful 
threat to the individual." (Berger, 1967, p. 21). When people, either as 
individuals or as groups, are dis-located from the socially established nomos 
they will experience anomy (Berger uses the Anglicized spelling as opposed 
to 'Anomie'; Berger, 1967, p. 21). "The socially established nomos may thus 
be understood, perhaps in its most important aspect, as a shield against 
terror. Put differently, the most important function of society is nomization. 
The anthropological presupposition for this is a human craving for meaning 
that appears to have the force of instinct. Men are congenitally compelled 
to impose a meaningful order upon reality." (Berger, 1967, p. 22). 
This meaningful order may be called into question by those 'marginal 
situations' which "reveal the innate precariousness of all social worlds." 
(Berger, 1967, p. 23). These marginal situations include separation from 
society, dreams and fantasy, and, above all else, death. "Seen in the 
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perspective of society, every nomos is an area of meaning carved out of a 
vast mass of meaninglessness, a small clearing of lucidity in a formless, 
dark, always ominousjungle."(Berger, 1967, p. 23). 
These symbolic, socially objectivated, universes of meaning provide a 
canopy of taken-for-granted 'knowledge' wberebynomos and cosmos appear 
t.o be one and the same reality (Berger, 1967, p. 25). This 'reality' may be 
underst.ood anthropologically (a theory of human natw·e) or cosmologically 
(as in more traditional societies; Berger, 1967, p. 25). Likewise, "Religion is 
the human enterprise by which a sacred cosmos is established. Put 
differently, religion is cosmization in a sacred mode." (Berger, 1967, p. 25). 
As part of the process of externalization, whereby meaning is poured out 
into reality (Berger, 1967, p. 27), religion may be conceived of as "the 
audacious attempt to conceive of the entire universe as being humanly 
significant." (Berger, 1967, p. 28). Given the effects of secularization in 
contemporary society theories of human nature may assume a secular, 
scientific definition. However, it is worth remembering that "Viewed 
historically, most of man's worlds have been sacred worlds. Indeed, it 
appears likely that only by way of the sacred was it possible for man to 
conceive of the cosmos in the first place." (Berger, 1967, p. 27). 
As with the discussion in The Social Construction of Reality Berger moves 
from. the concerns of world-construction (the social construction of reality) 
t.o the concerns of world-maintenance (legitimation) in his discussion in The 
Sacred Canopy. "All socially construct--od worlds are inherently precarious. 
Supported by human activity, they are constantly threatened by the facts 
of self-interest and stupidity." (Berger, 1967, p. 29). Socialization serves t.o 
internalize the socially constructed world within the subjective 
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consciousness of each of the members within a society. Social control 
serves to contain individuals and groups within socially defined limits; 
whereas, legitimation serves to explain andjustify that socially constructed 
world. "By legitimation is meant socially objectivated 'knowledge' that 
serves to explain and justify the social order. Put differently, legitimations 
are answers to any questions about the 'why' of institutional 
arrangements." (Berger, 1967, p. 29). Berger's discussion oflegitimation in 
The Sacred Canopy closely follows that put forward by Berger and 
Ludemann in The Social Construction of Reality (supra vule, pp. 49 - 51). 
What is unique in the present volume is the way Berger discusses religion 
and legitimation. Berger firstly reaffirms several points made, with 
Ludemann, in The Social Construction of Reality; namely, that the nomos 
provided by a symbolic universe involves "an all embracing 
Weltamchauung." (Berger, 1967, p. 32). Then, reiterating that "The 
essential purpose of all forms of legitimation may be described as reality-
maintenance, both on the objective and the subjective levels." (Berger, 
1967, p. 32). Then Berger goes on to make the link between religion and 
legitimation. "All legitimation maintains socially defined reality. Religion 
legitimates so effectively because it relates the precarious reality 
constructions of empirical societies with ultimate reality." (Berger, 1967, p. 
32). Raving made this connection Berger further suggests that "Religion 
legitimates social institutions by bestowing upon them an ultimately valid 
ontological statns, that ls, by locating them within a sacred and cosmic 
frame of reference." (Berger, 1967, p. 33). However, with respect to the link 
between religion and legitimation, Berger goes on to suggest that "Religion 
thus serves to maintain the reality of that socially constructed world within 
which men exist in their everyday lives. Its legitimating power, however, 
has another important dimension - the integration into a comprehensive 
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nomos of precisely those marginal situations in which the reality of 
everyday life is put in question." (Berger, 1967, p. 42). These marginal 
situations include: 
sleep; 
the transition between sleep and wakefulness; 
dreams and nightmares; 
death; 
natural catastrophe; 
war; 
social upheaval; 
the 'official' exercise of violence, for instance, in capital punishment; 
physical illness; and 
mental illness. 
These marginal situations involve "standing, or stepping, outside reality as 
commonly defined." (Berger, 1967, p. 43). Marginal situations are, according 
to Berger, moments of 'ecstasy' where the individual "steps out, alone, to 
face the dark." (Berger, 1963, p. 171; Berger, 1967, p. 43). In other words, 
religion incorporates those experiences which would otherwise fall outside 
the world-taken-for-granted within a socially legitimated symbolic universe. 
In so doing, the fear of anomy is alleviated by an all embracing, sacred 
canopy of meaning. 
Berger draws a clear link between religion and society by suggesting that 
religion is one of the great legitimating forces within society, and that 
religion and society share the same origin. "Rather, the point is that the 
same human activity that produces society also produces religion, with the 
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relation between the two products always being a dialectical one." (Berger, 
1967, p. 47). Furthermore, Berger adds that "The implication of the rootage 
of religion in human activity is not that religion is always a dependent 
variable in the history of a society, but rather that it derives its objective 
and subjective reality from human beings, who produce and reproduce it in 
their ongoing lives." (Berger, 1967, p. 48). 
This raises the issne of the plausibility and credibility of religion. "The power 
of religion depends, in the last resort, upon the credibility of the banners it 
puts into the hands of men as they stand before death, or more accurately, 
as they walk, inevitably, toward it." (Berger, 1967, p. 51). This is the 
problem of theodicy. Traditionally, theodicies sought to provide an 
explanation (religious legitimation) of how to live through anomic 
phenomena, and are typically eXPlained in terms of the nomos (sacred 
canopy) established in the society in question (Berger, 1967, p. 53). 
Theodicies were often seen as the solution to individual suffering (a solution 
to the problem of evil). Weber terms such things as the legitimation of 
political authority, or the assuagement of social rebellion, as the 'theodicy of 
suffering.' (Berger, 1963, p. 134; supra uide, p. 38). The need people have for 
such theodicies, so as to provide meaning in otherwise meaningless 
situations, is highlighted by Ritschl 
From the bird's-eye view of the historian all this may not seem to 
have been tragic because in the course of decades and centuries such 
events can prove favourable or fade away. However, for the person 
alive at the time this perspective means little or nothing. Millions of 
people live in a state of hopeless aporia, in which any decision is 
meaningless. By that I mean not only the poor, say in West Africa, 
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Asia and South America, but also their and our politicians, who are 
entangled in obligations before they even begin the process of 
decision. The history I have described behind the tragedy of world 
history consists of the untold individual stories of children who grew 
up in anxiety and hatred, mothers with too many demands made on 
them, failed marriages, disappointed husbands, embittered old people 
• individual destinies which are not only unfulfilled but unfulfillable. 
(Ritschl, 1986, p. 194). 
For "It is not happiness that theodicy primarily provides, but meaning." 
(Berger, 1967, p. 58). This meaning is required by society, and individuals 
within society, by virtue of the anomic forces which disrupt, or even 
destroy, the established order. 
Every nomos is established, over and over again, against the threat 
of destruction by the anomic forces endemic to the human condition. 
In religious terms, the sacred order of the cosmos is reaffirmed, over 
and over again, in the face of chaos. It is evident that this fact poses 
a problem on the level of human activity in society, inasmuch as this 
activity must be so institutionalized as to continue despite the 
recurrent intrusion into individual and collective experience of the 
anomic (or, if one prefers, denomizing) phenomena of suffering, evil 
and, above all, death. However, a problem is also posed on the level of 
legitimation. The anomic phenomena must not only be lived through, 
they must also be explained - to wit, explained in terms of the no mos 
established in the society in question. An explanation of these 
phenomena in terms of religious legitimations, of whatever degree of 
theoretical sophistication, may be called a theodicy. (Berger, 1967, 
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p. 53). 
Theodicies, as socially constructed religious legitimations, provide an over-
archlng canopy of meaning for those who inhabit that canopy of meaning. 
Theodicies serve to maintain the institutional order oYin society. "Put 
simply, theodicies provide the poor with a meaning for their poverty, but 
may also provide the rich with a meaning for their wealth. In both cases the 
result is one ofworld-maint.enance and, very concretely, of the maintenance 
of the particular institutional order." (Berger, 1967, p. 59). To dis-confirm 
this theodicy is to create enormous social change as well. "In all cases, the 
disintegration of the plausibilityoftheodicies legitimating social inequalities 
is potentially revolutionary in its consequences" (Berger, 1967, p. 60). The 
Western/Christian theodicy has, through secularization and pluralism, 
suffered from empirical dis-confirmation and, therefore, has declined in 
plausibility too. (Berger, 1967, pp. 78 - '79; infra vide, pp. 69 - 70). 
Berger, in the second half of The Sacred Canopy ('Historical Elements'), 
goes on to discuss the effect secularization has upon religious legitimation, 
and the problem of the plausibility of religion caused by secularization (and 
suggests in a few pages a way forward out of this problem in Appendix II, 
Sociological and Theological Perspectives, which he later develops and uses 
as the basis of A Rumour of Angels (1969) ). However, throughout the 
whole volume ( of The Sacred Cano!!Y) Berger remains faithful to his 
expressed int.ention of pushing "to the final sociological consequence an 
understanding of religion as a historical product." (Berger, 1967, p. v). 
In spite of the collapse of traditional theodicies Berger maintains that 
religion (those signals of transcendence, in particular; infra vide, p. 82 - 88) 
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still has a place to play in human culture. This thesis describes and outlines 
the ways in which Berger explores what aspects of religious meaning are 
compatible with modernity. This is the problem oflegitimating a theodicy in 
Post-Enlightenment society. 
Legitimating a theodicy that has plausibility for contemporary society 
involves the construction of a system of meaning which is relevant to the 
lived experience of those living within Post-Enlightenment society. Such a 
contemporary theodicy needs to include such factors as the 
interrelationship between self, others, the world, and the transcendent so as 
to provide some basis for an authentic and meaningful existence (supra 
vide, p. 39). This task, of legitimating a contemporary theodicy, is taken up 
by Berger in A Rumour of Angels ( 1969 ). 
Given that a religious legitimation of the socially constructed reality (a 
theodicy) requires a fundamental attitude which is "in itself quite irrational", 
and that "This attitude is the surrender of self to the ordering power of 
society. Put differently, every nomos entails a transcendence of 
individuality" (Berger, 1967, p. 54); then there is a sense in which religion is 
an agent of alienation. Alienation "is the process whereby the dialectical 
relationship between the indi.vidual and his world is lost to consciousness. 
The individual 'forgets' that this world was and continues to be co-produced 
by him." (Berger, 1967, p. 85). Religion has been such an effective agent of 
alienation because it posits that the sociallyobjectivated knowledge of that 
which it considers to be reality is in fact of cosmic or divine, not human, 
origin. Because of this, social institutions which are deemed by religion to be 
of sacred or di.vine origin (for instance: monarchy, marriage, church, law, 
and so on) are seen to be necessities over which one, as a member of that 
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society, has no choice or control. 'Bad faith' and 'false consciousness' (supra 
vi.de, pp. 23, 39, 42) then ensue because the individual feels alienated from 
society and that they are not able to influence the institutions which are, in 
fact, created by, and always interacting with, humanity. Therefore any 
contemporary theodicy, or system of meaning, must be able to be 
historically concerned (that is, conscious of its originE: and open to the 
future), empirical (that is, open to scrutiny and review), inductive (that is, 
dealing with concrete reality, not abstract theory), and concerned with 
people's lived experience. 
In Section II of The Sacred Canopy Berger examines the 'Historical 
Elements' of his sociological theory of religion. The process of secularization, 
along with pluralism (supra vide, p. 53), is held by Berger to be of central 
importance as an influence upon contemporary religion and religious 
institutions. Berger defines secularization as "the process by which sectors 
of society and culture are removed from the domination of religious 
institutions and symbols." (Berger, 1967, p. 107). This phenomenon is a 
modern one, particularly powerful in Western society (Berger, 1967, p. 108; 
supra vide, pp. 25 - 28). The economic process of industrial capitalism, 
accompanied by political secularization, along with the Protestant world-
view which divested itself of such 'sacred' elements as mystery, miracle, 
and magic led to a situation where "Religiously speaking, the world becomes 
very lonely indeed." (Berger, 1967, p. 112). In this situation law and ethics 
replace the timeless cosmic order (Berger, 1967, p. 119). As 'the ch:irch' 
becomes the sphere of 'the sacred' it defines itself over and against 'the 
world' and, as such, develops a doctrine of 'two spheres' ( one holy, the other 
profane; supra vide, pp. 19 - 20). The 'secular world' then achieves a status 
which is, in fact, a theological legitimation (Berger, 1967, p. 123). As people 
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have become increasingly dis-enfranchized, through the process of 
secularization, from the religious legitimations which were, but no longer 
are, meaningful then there is a serious problem of plausibility for these 
religious legitimations. This is because the process of secularization has 
lessened people's readiness to give their assent to a metaphysic which is 
open to empirical clis-confirmation. It needs to 'ring true,' that is, to be true 
to peop!e's lived experience. Furthermore, the competing truth claims 
(pluralism), and availability of options (be they religious, philosophical, or to 
do with 'life-style') has led to a deinstitutionalization of religion. The 
normative claims of one religion, or sacred canopy, balance out the claims 
of the others. This, in tum, leads to a pluralistic market situation (Berger, 
1967, p. 138), where "a 'religious preference' can be abandoned as readily as 
it was first adopted." (Berger, 1967, p. 134). In this situation "insofar as 
religion is common it lacks reality, and insofar as it is 'real' it lacks 
commonality." (Berger, 1967, p. 134). This process of secularization and 
pluralism seems to accompany a deinstitutionalization of meaning (supra 
vide, pp. 52 - 53). The legitimations which maintained the former social 
construction of reality and linked the precarious social reaiity found in 
society with ultimate reality have proved to be inadequate given the lived 
experience of people. As such, the theodicies which legitimated the socially 
constructed reality became open to dis-confirmation. That these theodicies 
were linked to political structures which used these theodicies to legitimate 
their position or power (for instance, the bureaucratization of the church; 
Berger, 1963, pp. 46 - 47; 1967, p. 140), to question the theodicy was a 
political action as well as a religious one (supra vide, p. 67). Therefore, there 
is a need to legitimate a contemporary theodicy which is true to people's 
lived experience. 
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Berger, by linking the function of a theodicy with that of making meaning 
(supra vi.de, p. 66), allows for theodicies t.o be conceived of in the broader 
context of making meaning in contemporary society. As such, a 
contemporary theodicy needs t.o include (indeed, it needs to be inclusive, 
rather than exclusive) such factors as the relationship between self, others, 
the world, and the transcendent so as to provide some basis for an 
authentic and meaningful existence (supra vide, p. 39). There is a need for a 
more inclusive theodicy (other than the traditional individualistic type) 
which has hermeneutic concern for the 'whole' (wholeness of self, wholeness 
in relationships with others, wholeness with the world/environment, and 
wholeness with the transcendent). However, this 'wholeness' will not be 
provided by over-arching (public) structures or systems; it will need t.o be 
through chosen, private means which reflect the Post-Modernist situation 
where 'closure' on a grand scale is unobtainable (Marshall, 1992, pp. 192 • 
193). Berger's work provides the possibility for this legitimation of a 
theodicy (or theodicies) which will provide meaning in Post-Enlightenment 
society (infra vi.de, pp. 74 - 88). 
Given that religion (that is, socially constructed religious legitimations) 
served to provide a coherent over·arching sacred canopy for a society, it 
remains to be said that due to the secularization, and subsequent pluralism, 
of/in society it is conceivable that such over-arching (public) religious 
universes will continue to lose their legitimating power and that more 
private, chosen religious preferences will pre-dominate with various sub-
universes competing for membership. (Berger, 1967, pp. 127 · 153). 
Objective 'truth' is de-objectivated, or 'subjectivized.' (Berger, 1967, p. 157). 
Berger maintains that the factors which led t.o "this crisis of religion on the 
level of commonsense knowledge is not due to any mysterious 
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metamorphoses of consciousness, but can he explained in terms of 
empirically available developments in the social structures and social 
psychology of modern societies." (Berger, 1967, p. 156). These 
developments are outlined in 'The Background to B.erger's Thought' (supra 
vide, pp. 16 - 31). 
Berger sums up The Sacred Canopy by defining religion as "a human 
projection, grounded in specific infrastructures of human history." (Berger, 
1967, p. 180). However, Berger insists that itis 
Only after the theologian has confronted the historical relativity of 
religion can he genuinely ask where in this history it may, perhaps, 
be possible to speak of discoveries - discoveries, that is, that 
transcend the relative character of their infrastructures. And only 
after he has really grasped what it means to say that religion is a 
human product or projection can he begin to search, within this 
array of projections, for what may turn out to be signals of 
transcendence. I strongly suspect that such an inquiry will turn 
increasingly from the projections to the projector, that is, will become 
an enterprise in anthropology. An 'empirical theology' is, of course, 
methodologically impossible. But a theology that proceeds in a step· 
by-step correlation with what can be said about man empirically is 
well worth a serious try. 
It is in such an enterprise that a conversation between sociology and 
theology is most likely to bear intellectual fruits. It will be clear from 
the above that this will require partners, on both sides, with a high 
degree of openness. In the absence of such partners, silence is by far 
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the better course. (Berger, 1967, p. 185; infra uide, pp. 86 • 87, 95). 
Berger, as it happens, did not remain silent. He proceeded to attempt such 
a correlation between theology and humanity (based upon sociological 
theory) in his work A Rumour of Angels ... Morlern Society and the 
Recliscovery ofthfl_Supematural (1969) (infra uide, pp. 74 · 88). 
' ,, 
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A RUMOUR OF ANGELS .•• Modern Society and the Rediscovery of 
the Supernatural (1969): 
A Rumour of Angels represents the culmination of an argument which 
Berger developed over the course of the material reviewed in this section. 
Berger begins with Invitation to Sociology (1963) in which he develops a 
general understanding of sociology. This understanding is one which is 
greatly influenced by the sociology of knowledge. Berger uses the sociology 
of knowledge to develop an understanding of the social construction of 
reality in the book of the same name, together with Thomas Luckmann, 
namely: The Social Construction of Reality (1966). Berger and Luckmann 
suggest that universes of meaning are created and maintained, through 
social processes, within society. One such universe of meaning is religion, 
and Berger analyses religion using an understanding developed within the 
sociology of knowledge in his book The Sacred Canopy (1967). So as t-0 avoid 
the suggestion of methodological atheism, at the conclusion of The Sacred 
Canopy Berger suggests an approach to religion which he develops in A 
Rumour of Angels (1969) (supra vide, p. 72) which, nonetheless, retains a 
systematic methodology, as developed in The Social Construction of Reality 
and The Sacred Canopy. and sociological perspective. 
Berger, in the Introduction to the 1990 edition of A Rumour of Angels, 
explains his rationale for completing the programme outlined above. 
First, I wanted to show how the intellectual tools of the social 
sciences, which had contributed greatly to the loss of credibility of 
religion, could be turned on the very ideas that had thus discredited 
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supernatural views of the world and on the people propagating those 
· ideas. I called this project 'relativizing the relativizers.' And second, I 
wanted to draw a very rough sketch of an approach to theologizing 
that began with ordinary human experience, more specifically with 
elements of that experience that point toward a reality beyond the 
ordinary. I called this approach 'inductive' and I indicated a number 
of experiential complexes that could be considered 'signals of 
transcendence.' I suggested that here was to be found the basis of a 
theological program rooted in what Europeans call philosophical 
anthropology and in the broad tradition of liberal Protestantism 
stretching back to Friedrich Schleiermacher. Unlike many 
expressions of the liberal Protestant tradition, however, such a 
program would not secularize the religious definitions of reality; on 
the contrary, it would, as it were, transcendentalize secularity. 
(Berger, 1969, pp. ix - x). 
Berger's humanistic concern is also an important factor in seeing through 
this project. "Put differently, keeping alive the rumour of angels is to 
contribute to the humanization of our time." (Berger, 1969, p. xiii). 
As Berger outlined in The Sacred Canopy (supra uide, pp. 69 - 70), 
secularization and pluralism have profoundly shaken the foundations of the 
traditional supernatural world-view. Berger defines the term 'supernatural' 
as denoting "a fundamental category of religion, namely the assertion or 
belief that there is an other reality, and one of ultimate significance for man, 
which transcends the reality within which our everyday experience unfolds. 
It is this fundamental assumption about reality, rather than this or that 
historical variation of it, that is allegedly defunct or in the process of 
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becoming defunct in the modern world." (Berger, 1969, p. 2). 
Berger's concern is how to correlate the supernatural with the life-world, or 
world-taken-for-wanted "within which we carry on our 'normal' activities in 
collaboration with other men." (Berger, 1969, p. 3). 
Given that fewer people, at least within modern societies, are able to 
connect in any meaningful way with the religious legitimations which owe 
their origin to times and places far removed from the contemporary 
situation there is, as mentioned above (supra vide, pp. 69 ~ 70), a need to 
construct, or legitimate, a theodicy, or system of meaning, which is relevant 
to people in modern society. However, those who suggest that it is possible 
to hold a socio-historical world-view consistent with the sociology of 
knowledge, yet who also assent to the place of the supernatural within that 
world-view will find themselves in a 'cognitive minority.' (Berger, 1967, pp. 
184 · 185; Berger, 1969, pp. 6 - 7). Such a person holding such a view is on 
the outside of socially legitimated views on religion, society, and philosophy: 
religion, because of the way revelation is central to 'orthodox' belief; society, 
because so many people within contemporary society are dis-enfranchized 
with such an orthodox view of religion in particular, and with organized 
religion in general; and philosophy, because the prevailing intellectual 
'orthodoxy' does not admit to the place of the supernatural. It is into this 
unenviable situation that Berger sets forth the place and validity of the 
supernatural within contemporary society. 
Berger refers to the 'Protestantization' of religious groups which is a result 
of the increasing secularization and pluralism within modern society. Berger 
is, nonetheless, an admirer of the honesty which Protestantism 
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(particularly such theologians as Schleiermacher) has maintained in its 
interaction with modernity." It was Protestantism that first underwent the 
onslaught of secularization; Protestantism that first adapted itself to 
societies in which several faiths existed on equal terms, the pluralism that 
may be regarded as a twin phenomenon of secularization, and it was 
Protestant theology that the cognitive challenges to traditional 
supernaturalism were first met and fought through." (Berger, 1969, p. 17). 
It is in this tradition that Berger sets forth his thesis on the relevance of the 
supernatural in contemporary society. Not in a spirit of accommodation, or 
reduction, or translation, but by developing an inductive theology (or 
theodicy, or system of meaning; Berger, 1969, p. 22). 
From the perspective of sociology (in particular, from the sociology of 
knowledge and the history of ideas) Berger argues that it is possible to 'see 
clearly' (supra vide, pp. 35 · 36), or to be able to 'relativize the relativizers.' 
(Berger, 1969, p. 31). This socio-historical world-view has come about 
through the development of various intellectual movements. Berger refers 
to several of these movements, citing in particular: 
the physical sciences - where such people as Copernicus and 
Galileo challenged the cosmology of the Middle Ages; 
therevolutioninbiology - where humanity is not only alone 
cosmologically, but also subject to physical forces which are common to all 
other creatures; 
the hum.an sciences - historical scholarship highlighted the 
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historicity of all religious traditions, and psychology attributed much within 
the religious traditions as being a projection of human needs and desires; 
and 
the history ofideas and the sociology of knowledge • highlight the 
relativity of the religious traditions. (Berger, 1969, pp. 33 - 36). 
The sociology of knowledge, which provides a sociological perspective on the 
above developments, is one of the chief means Berger employs to carry out 
his task of'relativizing the relativizers.' (Berger, 1969, p. 38). The sociology 
of knowledge 
is concerned with studying the relationship between human 
thought and the social conditions und~r which it occurs ... One of the 
fundamental propositions of the sociology of knowledge is that the 
plausibility, in the sense of what people actually find credible, of 
views of reality depends upon the social support these receive. Put 
more simply, we obtain our notions about the world originally from 
other human beings, and these notions continue to be plausible to us 
in a very large measw-e because others continue to affirm them. 
(Berger, 1969, p. 38). 
Various factors such as social definitions of reality, social relations that 
take these for granted, as well as the supporting therapies (social controls) 
and legitimations provide a plausibility structure of the conception in 
question. (Berger, 1969, pp. 39 · 40). Plausibility structures help to 
maintain the integrity or uniqueness of a conception, institution, or any 
form of socially constructed reality. Berger maintains that the same 
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mechanisms apply to the construction and maintenance of all forms of 
socially constructed reality. (Berger, 1969, p. 42). The formula "extra 
ecclesiam nulla salus" ("there is no salvation outside the church."), may just 
as well be put as the proposition that there is "no plausibility without the 
appropriate plausibility structure." (Berger, 1969, p. 42; supra vide, p. 56). 
The mystery of faith now becomes scientifically graspable, 
practiceJly repeatable, and generally applicable. The magic 
disappears as the mechanisms of plausibility generation and 
plausibility maintenance become transparent. The community of 
faith is now understandable as a constructed entity • it has been 
constructed in a specific human history, by human beings ... The 
formula, once an affirmation of unique authority, thus becomes a 
general rule ... In other words, the theologian's world has become one 
world among many - a generalization of the problem of relativity that 
goes considerably beyond the dimensions of the problem as posed by 
historical scholarship. To put it simply. History posits the problem of 
relativity as a fact, the sociology of knowledge as a necessity of our 
condition. (Berger, 1969, p. 42). 
Various attempts have been made by theologians to dismiss this view, 
most notably the Neo-Orthodox distinction between 'religion' and 'Christian 
faith.' (supra vide, p. 21). The effect of this view was to provide a theological 
legitimation of secularization. (supra vide, p. 69). Berger, however, is not 
prepared to pretend that such insights as put forward by the sociology of 
knowledge do not exist, or that such insights are unimportant; Berger 
attaches great importsnce to the insights of the sociology of knowledge, for 
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When everything has been subsumed under the r alativizing 
categories in question (those of history, of the sociology of knowledge, 
or what-have-you), the question of truth reasserts itself in almost 
pristine simplicity. Once we know that all human affirmations are 
subject to scientifically graspable socio-historical processes, which 
affirmatio,u; are true and which are false? (Berger, 1969, p. 45). 
The situation in contemporary society is one of pluralism, which includes 
"any situation in which there is more than one world view available to the 
members of a society, that is, a situation in which there is competition 
between world views." (Berger, 1969, p. 47). Modern society is less able to 
provide firm plausibility structure, and hence pluralism develops, because 
Modern societies are, by their nature, highly differentiated and 
segmented, while at tbe same time allowing for a high degree of 
communication between their segmented subsocieties. The reasons 
for this, while complex, are not all mysterious. They result from the 
degree of division oflabour brought about by industrial forms of 
production, and from the patterns of settlement, social stratification, 
and communication engendered by industrialism. (Berger, 1969, pp. 
47 - 48). 
This pluralistic situation requires one to choose from amongst competing 
world-views for a system of meaning. Such institutions as tribe or clan are 
no longer able to provide simple and all-embracing plausibility structures. 
The individual in modern society resides amongst competing sub-universes 
which tend to be secular (work, recreation, and community). This has 
largely contributed to the decline in the potency (plausibility) of traditional 
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religious legitimations. The plausibility structures which previously defined 
'the faith' are now on the edge, rather than at the centre, of modem society. 
So much so that it is possible to say that people now inhabit a different 
world. However, the present situation is just as much influenced by the 
same legitimating forces as in any other age; it simply manifests itself 
differently. (Berger, 1969, pp. 49 • 50). Gaede states that 
Society is pluralistic; it evidences heterogeneity of religious 
experiences and truth claims; we must take all or these empirical 
phenomena seriously; therefore, we cannot accept as a prior claim 
an exclusive truth. Thus the starting point of Berger's critique is an 
empirical statement about the nature of modern social conditions, 
from which he draws an epistemological conclusion about method, 
out of which he will derive (one may assume) some ontological 
assertions about religious truth. In other words, here once again is 
evidence of the impact of his sociological conception of reality upon 
his theological endeavour. (Gaede, in Hunter and Ainlay, 1986, p. 
171). 
Given that, as Berger maintains, nothing is immune from the relativization 
of socio-historical analysis, is it at all possible to legitimate a system of 
meaning that is "in, with, and under" (Berger, 1969, p. 52) the human 
projections which constitute religion? And is this system of meaning a 
pointer to a reality which may be called supernatural? Berger believes so, 
and begins his inductive theologizing by starting with humanity. In other 
words, Berger uses anthropology as the starting point for his theology. This 
theology is not "an empirical theology · that would be logically impossible · 
but rather a theology of very high empirical sensitivity that seeks to 
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correlate its propositions with what can be empirically known." (Berger, 
1969, p. 53). 
Berger suggests that various 'signals of transcendence,' which are 
constituted by 'prorotypica.l human gestures,' provide the starting point for 
this inductive theology. (Berger, 1969, p. 59). These signals of 
transcendence are "phenomena that are to be found within the domain of 
our 'natural' reality but that appear to point beyond that reality." (Berger, 
1969, p. 59). And, by prototypical human gestures Berger means "certain 
reiterated acts and experiences that appear to express essential aspects of 
man's bei11g, of the human animal as such." (Berger, 1969, p. 59). Berger 
does not mean that these prototypical human gesbu-es are 'archetypal' in a 
Jungian sense; rather, they belong, not in the depths but, in the realm of 
"ordinary everyday awareness." (Berger, 1969, pp. 59 • 60). 
Berger uses a similar line of argument here to the one he used regarding 
freedom in his previous book Inyjtation to Sociology (1963) (supra vide, pp. 
23, 39 • 40). This argument is grounded in a humanistic 
(Kantian/phenomenological) epistemology. (Abercrombie, in Hunter and 
Ainlay, 1986, p. 12). 
The first of Berger's signals of transcendence is Berger's argument from 
order. (Berger, 1969, pp. 60 · 64). There is a propensity for order in society, 
as opposed to anomy. This 'nomization' is an inductive experience whereby 
fundamental trust in reality is expressed (Kung, 1980, p. 568 ff. ). It is most 
evident in the comforting of a child by its parent. When the parent says to 
the child "Don't be afraid - everything is in order, everything is all right.", the 
parent's reassurance transcends "the immediat.ely present two individuals 
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and their situation, [and] implies a statement about reality as such." (Berger, 
1969, p. 62). Berger goes on to say that 
The argument from ordering is metaphysical rather than ethical. To 
restate it: In the observable human propensity to order reality there 
is an intrinsic impulse to give cosmic scope to this order, an impulse 
that implies not only that human order in some way corresponds to 
an order that transcends it, but that this transcendent order is of 
such a character that man can trust himself and his destiny to it. 
(Berger, 1969, pp. 63 • 64). 
Berger's argument here, and with the other signals of transcendence, relies 
on an inductive process. (supra vide, pp. 29 · 30). "By 'inductive faith,' then, 
I mean a religious process of thought that begins with facts of human 
experience; conversely, 'deductive faith' begins with certain assumptions 
(notably assumptions about divine revelation) that cannot be tested by 
experience." (Berger, 1969, pp. 64 • 65). This line of argument is consistent 
with Berger's use of a humanistic, particularly Kantian, epistemology. Kant 
drew a distinction between 'Phenomena' (things as they appear), and 
'Noumena' (things in themselves). Kant maintains that we cannot prove 
the noumenal, we can only prove the phenomenal. (Kling, 1980, pp. 537 • 
551; supra vide, p. 26). Furthermore, apart from being derived from 
·experience and empirical reality, the signals of transcendence belong to the 
common person and are consistent with Berger's emphasis (following 
Schutz) on the 'paramount reality of everyday life.' (supra vide, pp. 43 • 44). 
The second signal of transcendence is Berger's argument from play. 
(Berger, 1969, pp. 65 • 68). Play is a basic experience of humanity (as is 
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order). To play might involve the play of children, or of the musician, or of 
the lovers, or the artist, or the actor. "In playing, one steps out of one time 
into another." (Berger, 1969, p. 65). Play is usually a joyful experience, and 
seems to bracket the 'serious' reality of life; yet it is "readily found in the 
reality of ordinary life." (Berger, 1969, p. 67). Though there is no way of 
proving it, it remains to be said tt.'et in play one enters another 
(eternal/supernatural) world. 
The third signal of transcendence is Berger's argument from hope (Berger, 
1969, pp. 68 - 73), whereby meaning may be found in those experiences 
which threaten socially constructed reality. Frankl (1969) is quoted by 
Coward (1990, p. 162) as claiming 
that a person finds meaning in life through self-transcendence in 
three ways. The first is giving to the world through creativity, such 
as in family, occupation, and creative works. The second is taking 
from the world by being receptive to others and to one's environment. 
The third is finding meaning in the attitude one takes to one's 
predicament when faced with an unchangeable situation. Life can 
never cease to have meaning because, even when one is deprived of 
both the creative and experiential ways to find meaning, there 
remains the opportunity to determine the manner in which one faces 
adversity. 
In true Existential style, Berger suggests that absurdity cannot be avoided; 
however, meaninglessness can. 
The fourth signal of transcendence is Berger's argument from drunnation 
84 
(Berger, 1969, pp. 73 • 77), where when humanity is violated to such an 
extent that there is a cry for justice. There seems to be something 
fundamental to human nature which abhors injustice and inhumanity. 
Putting it positively, there is a profound care for humanity at the heart of 
our existence. (Berger, 1969, p. 181). 
The fifth signal of transcendence is Berger's argument from humour. 
(Berger, 1969, pp. 77 • 81). Berger uses the argument from humour to 
reflect "the imprisonment of the human spirit in the world." (Berger, 1969, p. 
78). This (tragi·) comic perspective relates to Berger's notions of freedom 
and social responsibility, which are arrived at through the process of 
sociological understanding ('V erstehen'). 
Another option is what we regard as the most plausible one to result 
from sociological understanding, one that can combine compassion, 
limited commitment and a sense of the comic in man's social 
carnival. This will lead to a posture vis-a-vis society based on a 
perception of the latter as essentially a comedy, in which men parade 
up and down with their gaudy costumes, change hats and titles, hit 
each other with sticks they have or the ones they can persuade their 
fellow actors to believe in. Such a comic perspective does not 
overlook the fact that non-existent sticks can draw real blood, but it 
will not from this fact fall into the fallacy of mistaking the Potemkin 
village for the City of God. If one views society as a comedy, one will 
not hesitate to cheat, especially ifby cheating one can alleviate a 
little pain here or make life a little brighter there. One will refuse to 
take seriously the rules of the game, except insofar as these rules 
protect real human beings and foster real human values. Sociological 
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Machiavellianism is thus the very opposite of cynical opportunism. 
It is the way in which freedom can realize itself in social action. 
(Berger, 1963, pp. 184 - 185). 
All of these signals of transcendence belong to the common person (not to 
'spiritual virtuosi'), and all are inductive in so far as they are taken from the 
empirical reality of lived experience. They are all pre-theoretical and are 
from the 'bottom-up.' That is, they are concerned with 'everyday reality.' 
Berger makes no claims to providing "an exhaustive or exclusive list of 
human gestures that may be seen as signals of transcendence." (Berger, 
1969, p. 81). Other possible signals of transcendence which could perhaps 
be included (so as to provide an extension and update of Berger's 
suggestions) might be such gestures as: 
a sense of care similar to the giving and receiving mentioned by 
Frankl (supra vide, p. 84); 
significant relationships in which the above care is lived out; 
a fundamental trust in reality which stems from the above care. 
(Kling, 1980, p. 568 ff.; Berger, 1992, p. 134); and 
a sense of wholeness (with self, with others, with the 
world/environment, and with the transcendent). 
In all of the above Berger seeks to revive "a spirit of patient induction and 
an attitude of openness to the fullness of human experience, especially as 
this experience is accessible to historical inquiry.• (Berger, 1969, p. 94). As 
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such, Berger would p:refer to use the term 'discoveries' as opposed to 
'revelation,' for the concept of revelation requires a deductive theological 
methodology, whereas the concept of discoveries requires an inductive 
theological methodology. (supra vide, p. 72). 
Berger does not seek to prescribe the outworking of the signals of 
transcendence in a practical way, other than to say that confronting the 
traditions in a spirit of open dialogue and humility will enable the search for 
signals of transcendence to take place wherever they may be found. 
(Berger, 1969, pp. 94 • 98). This may involve the emergence of new groups 
which bear little or no resemblance to the traditional religious institutions, 
or it may be that the traditional religious institutions will adapt their 
practices to incorporate such signals of transcendence. (Berger, 1969, p. 
99). In ali of this though, one prototypical gesture will remain in Berger's 
opinion; and that is worship, whereby humanity "reaches out in hope 
toward transcendence." (Berger, 1969, p. 100). 
Berger's humanistic concern compels him to maintain that 'penultimate' 
events find "their ultimate significance ... in a reality that transcends them 
and that transcends the empirical coordinates of human existence." 
(Berger, 1969, p. 181). Again, it is immediately apparent the great influence 
which Bonhoeffer has had upon Berger. (supra vi.de, p. 20). The moral and 
political issues of modern society, which were of such grave concern for 
Bonhoeffer, must also be confronted in Berger's opinion, for the religious 
perspective is one which values and cares for the human. (Berger, 1969, p. 
181). Truth, for Berger, is essentially a religious concept. (Berger, 1969, p. 
182). And only by honestly searching for truth and justice will "the 
redeeming gestures of love, hope, and compassion ... [be] reiterated in 
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human experience." (Berger, 1969, p. 106). 
Here Berger concludes his dialogue with contemporary society which takes 
the form of A Rumour of Angels. 
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CHAPl'ER IV: AN EXAMINATION OF THE CENTRAL 
THEMES IN BERGER'S WORK 
Chapter Four provides an examination of the central themes in Berger's 
work, and is an attempt to examine and outline four core areas of Berger's 
work which may be identified from Chapter Three; namely: Berger's 
methodology; Berger's discussion of secularization and pluralism; Berger's 
ethical and political position; and Berger's discussion of religious meaning 
and modernity. 
Berger's latest work: A Far Glory: The Quest for Faith in an Age of 
Credulity (1992) forms a central part of this chapter, in that it highlights 
some of the ways in which Berger re"works and expands some of the 
themes he deals with in the works reviewed in Chapter Three; and in that it 
also highlights some developments in Berger's thought. 
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Berger's Methodology: 
Peter L. Berger, it would seem, is not taken seriously by the sociological 
'establishment.' Whilst most commentstors agree that he is an accessible 
and widely read contributor to sociological discourse, he is severely 
admonished for not ever having developed a, or contributed significantlyto, 
sociological theory (something which Berger vigorously denies; confer 
Berger, in Hunter and Ain!ay, 1986, p. 224). Berger does not appear in the 
listings of the 'Who's Who' of the social sciences, or in the sociological 
annuals, or in many dictionaries of sociology. However, he is one of the most 
widely read, living, sociologists. (Hunter and Ainlay, 1986, pp. 2 - 3). 
Wuthnow, commenting on Berger's work, claims that Berger's contribution 
to sociology has remained at an elementary level and that there is not 
much that is new to be found there (Wuthnow, in Wuthnow, Hunter, 
Bergesen, and Kurzwei!, 1984, pp. 72 - 73). 
Berger does, as mentioned above, feel that he has made his theoretical 
position and methodology obvious to all. 
One aspect of this, though, which I have always tsken seriously is 
the obligation to make clear my methodology to others and to myself 
(and here, I think I must disagree with Ainlay's assertion that I have 
failed to indicate a methodology for sociology). I have tried to be clear 
about my modus operandi from the beginning and, in collaboration 
with Hansfried Kellner, restated my methodological presuppositions 
in Sociology Reinterpreted. These presuppositions have remained 
Weberian throughout and they are likely to remain so. If I have not 
writtan more extensively on these matters, it is because I always felt 
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that I had nothing very original to contribute here. (Berger, in 
Hunter and Ainlay, 1986, p. 224). 
Berger has pursued his own intellectual agenda; one which he acknowledges 
has located him within a 'cogoitive minority' (supra uide, p. 76). That Berger 
is located within this, so called, cognitive minority would seem to highlight 
and suggest more about the prejudices of those who judge his work, than the 
worth of Berger's work itself. 
Berger's eclectic synthesis of much social theory re-captures something of 
the vision of classical sociology, and the substantive issues which it, as an 
academic discipline, sought to address. Berger's eclectic approach combines 
the works of such sociological 'greats' as Weber, Durkheim, and Marx. 
(Hunter and Ainlay, 1986, p. 3). 
I 
Berger's method appears to be very eclectic in its origins. He 
borrows his anthropological presuppositions and dialectical method 
from Marx, and his social psychology from Mead. His view of the 
nature of social reality as coercive and constraining depends a good 
deal on Durkheim, although he follows Weber in emphasizing the 
construction of social reality through subjective meanings. 
(Abercrombie, in Hunter and Ainlay, 1986, p. 16). 
This eclectic synthesis achieved by Berger enables him to provide a unique 
analysis and perception of modern society. The sheer accessibility of 
Berger's work is unique too in that Berger's methodology compels him to 
address issues of 'proto-typical' human concern, and to write about these 
concerns cleal"!y, fluently, and, at times, humorously. Whilst being eclectic 
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Berger will, nonetheless, stand as a unique contributor to the understanding 
and analysis of cultural issues in contemporary society. 
The influence of Berger's methodology (inductive, empirical, 
phenomenological, and Existential) enables Berger to provide a unique 
overview of the affects of modernity upon society. Berger is concerned to 
address substantive and interpretive issues and aspects of sociology, but 
because of his eclecticism is often deemed to be 'light weight' in his analysis. 
However, Berger's eclecticism, which is seen to be a weakness in the 
sociological establishment's eyes, is actually one of his great strengths. 
Berger frames these substantive and interpretive issues and aspects of 
sociology which he deals with (modernity, secularization, pluralism, religion, 
politics, and so on) within existing frames of reference. Berger draws on 
many sources to achieve his unique interpretive perspective (sources such 
as Neo·Orthodoxy, humanism, Existentialism, phenomenology, the 
sociology of knowledge, and the history of ideas). These sources enable 
Berger to conduct an ongoing dialogue with contemporary society, and the 
,. influences affecting it. Indeed, the depth and breadth of Berger's reading 
makes him a formidable scholar and a person ofletters. 
Perhaps Berger's eclecticism may, in part, be explained by the fact that his 
.· "meta-scientific presuppositions ... have religious rather than philosophical 
roots.• (Berger, in Hunter and Ainlay, 1986, p. 223). And that, because of 
this, he has remained "in the antechamber rather than the inner 
sanctuary" of philosophical discussions "because I always felt that I had 
nothing very original to contribute here." (Berger, in Hunter and Ainlay, 
1986, pp. 223 • 224). With reference to Berger's eclecticism Beckford 
92 
maintains that 
The influence of Kant, Hegel and Heidegger, no less than that of 
these philosophers' intellectual heirs, Max Weber and Alfred Schutz, 
is apparent in Berger and Luck:mann's orientation towards the 
meaning of modernity as it is generated in social interaction and 
experienced in the consciousness. This phenomenological turn of 
German social thought is blended with some of Marx's insights into 
the dynamics of conflict and competition between social classes. And, 
particularly in Luckmann's perspective on religion, extensive use is 
made of Durkheim's understanding of the suigeneris nature of social 
reality. The mixture of intellectual sources is completed with G. H. 
Mead's social psychological appreciation of the social process of self-
and identity-formation. The result of this admixture of such diverse 
theoretical ideas is an unquestionably innovative synthesis. 
(Beckford, 1989, pp. 87 - 88). 
It is with this understanding of society, and the forces which shape and 
affect it, that Berger seeks to locate religion as still having relevance, even 
given the secularized and pluralistic situation in contemporary society, 
within Western society. To achieve this, Berger relies upon 
an 'inductive' model of theologizing, as opposed to a 'reductive' and 
deductive model. That is, he starts his religious analyses with very 
concrete, everyday life experiences, such as anxiety, humour, and 
laughter, love, hope, play, etc. In them he searches for signals of 
, transcendence (that is, for clear indications of a reality which goes 
beyond the immediate here-and-now and which transcends our 
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physical senses and the limits of our clock-time). Such signals of 
transcendence are indeed the angels of our time, harbingers of a 
supernatural reality. He thus tries to open our eyes for an inductive 
type of religion which, if systematized theoretically, would lead to an 
inductive type of theology. (Zijderveld, in Hunter and Ainlay, 1986, 
p. 74). 
Needless to say, there are those who remain unconvinced by Berger's 
analysis of the place of religion in contemporary society, and who also reject 
his notion of the signals of transcendence in so far that "During the course 
of modernization, we have eaten from a tree of knowledge, and thereby lost 
a paradise of faith in redemption and salvation. The true tragedy of 
modernization in this respect is that no deduction, no reduction and no 
induction can ever put the canopy of Meaning together again." (Zijderveld, in 
Hunter and Ainlay, 1986, p. 75). 
Given Zijderveld's comments (and those of others too) Berger, nonetheless, 
maintains that belief is possible in the contemporary setting. Berger claims 
this, not because of some aprioristic insight of his but, because he believes 
it to be consistent with the lived experience of humanity; and that it is not 
reliant upon any pre-conceived theological or philosophical conceptions. 
Berger uses a similar line of argument here to the one he used regarding 
freedom in his previous book Invitation to Sociology (1963) (supra vide, pp. 
23, 39 • 40). 
God has not made it easy for human beings to believe, and the 
world provides good grounds for unbelief. I would prefer to pair belief 
with another, very conventional term· namely, krwwl.edge. Some 
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things I know, and some things I believe; generally speaking I don't 
have to believe what I know. Thus I know that 2 + 2 = 4. It makes 
, , little sense to say that I believe this. But if I have before me a closed 
box containing apples, I may say that I believe it contains four; rm 
not sure, but I have some reason to think that this is the number. In 
conventional usage, there is a stronger use of the word ~ as when I 
say that I believe in democracy, or in the integrity of my friend. Here 
too is a statement about something I don't know, but my belief is 
something stronger than a probability statement. It is an act that 
commits me and in which I invest something important, possibly 
that which is most important. In ordinary usage, of course, it is only 
this second type of belief that would be graced with the term "faith." 
(Berger, 1992, pp. 123 -124). 
Berger is content to admit that he does not have all the answers to the 
ontological questions which surround human existence. Silence in the face of 
this 'unknowing' is, in Berger's opinion, the most appropriate action. 
(Berger, 1967, p. 185; Berger, 1992, pp. 216 - 218). 
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Berger's DiscJ!§Sion of Secularization and Pluralis,n: 
Berger seeks to provide a via media between exclusivist religious positions 
on the one hand and secular relativists on the other. Berger sees the real 
challenge of modern pluralism being to insist (against the relativists) that 
there are truth claims involved in religious propositions, without at the 
same time arrogantly asserting (in the manner of the exclusivists) that 
one's own is the only path to religious truth. (Berger, 1992, pp. 75 - 77). 
It is not easy to live with pluralism. Democracy, both as an ideal 
and as a set of institutions, makes it easier in terms of practical, 
political arrangements, but it offers no help in coming to terms with 
the underlying existential problem. Taking a philosophical view of the 
matter, the challenge of modern pluralism to religion can be easily 
stated: It is a challenge to hold convictions without either dissolving 
them into utter relativity or encasing them in the false absolutes or 
fanaticism. (Berger, 1992, p. 46). 
For Berger it is truth which really matters, not the particular form in which 
it may happen to be expressed. "I am not finally troubled by the impact of 
cultural pluralism. The pluralizing forces ofmodernitydo indeed relativize 
all belief systems, but the truth will come out again and again. Truth resists 
relatiuization." (Berger, 1992, p. 77). The breakdown ofthe-world-taken-for-
granted evident in the pluralism of contemporary society opens up the 
opportunity for the "individual in quest of religious truth to make something 
of a fresh start." (Berger, 1992, p. 127). Whereas previously Berger claimed 
that secula,;..zation was the most profound effect of modernity upon society 
(Berger, 1967, p. 105 If.), and that pluralism was a side effect, or 'twin 
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phenomenon' (Berger, 1969, p. 17) of secularization (Berger and Luckmann, 
1966, p. 125), Berger now sees pluralism (and pluralization) as being the 
most significant effect of modernity upon society. (Berger, 1992, pp. 63 • 
78). 
f 
The one overriding fact to consider - a fact t.hat has become one of 
the truisms of the age, but which is true nonetheless· is that of 
cultural pluralism. The situation can be easily described: Through 
most of history, most human beings found themselves in a lifelong, 
single, highly int.egrated cultural environment; by contrast, today 
most human beings in the world - and the great majority in advanced 
industrial societies - constantly encounter foreign cultures, either by 
actual contact with representatives of those cultures or through 
various information media. The basic causes of this are aiso easily 
discerned, especially scientifically based technology, which has 
created an industrial economy, as well as the means of rapid 
transport and instantaneous communication that increasingly unify 
the globe. These powerful forces are at work worldwide, although 
obviously they are most powerful in the societies with the highest 
technological sophistication .... Pluralism also impinges on human 
consciousness, on what takes place within our minds. This internal, 
subjective process is what I have called 'pluralization.' Cultural 
plurality is experienced by the individual, not just as something 
external - all those people he bumps into - but as an internal reality, 
a set of options present in his mind. In other words, the different 
cultures he encounters in his social environment are transformed 
into alternative scenarios, options, for his own life. (Berger, 1992, pp. 
66 • 67). 
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Given that • Modernity is a gigantic movement from fate to choice in the 
human condition." (Berger, 1992, p. 89), and that humans are "compelled to 
choose." (Berger, 1992, p. 89); Berger regards the pluralistic situation as a 
positive, rather than a negative, situation. This pluralistic situation was 
ushered in through the shift in the mind-set of the Western world borne by 
Descartes' maxim 'Cogito ergo sum,' and the ever increasingindividualism 
which this maxim heralded in. In such a situation the individual is no longer 
defined by the clan or tribe. Rather the individual is able to choose who they 
will be. There is a greater freedom involved in this choice, and Berger 
maintains that "Only an individual with such a degree of freedom can be 
said to 'believe' at all. And again: Freedom presupposes solitariness. Thus it is 
only the solitary individual who can engage in an act of believing." (Berger, 
1992, p. 87). However, there is an 'escape from freedom' when individuals 
look for their definition of self in such group factors as 'nation' or in 
totalitarianism; where the ind.tvidual is defined by belonging to the group. 
Berger is obviously addressing the reality of contemporary, industrialized, 
Western society. He is not denigrating traditional societies where there is a 
greater congruency between the 'self and the 'group.' Berger is concerned to 
look for 'rumours' and 'hint.a' of transcendence in modern society given the 
breakdown of taken-for-granted structures in that society. Consistent with 
his argument in A Rumour of Angels, Berger holds that the breakdown of 
the taken-for-granted structures enables transcendence to become visible. 
(Berger, 1992, p. 127). 
Berger highlights the important consequences of pluralism on 
contemporary society, and upon any theologizing which can occur given the 
implications of pluralism. Again, Berger takes a positive app1·oach to the 
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development of this pluralistic situation for the individual believer, seeing it 
as the opportunity for the individual t.o choose an authentic existence. The 
affect of plurality upon the church though is a threat to its cla;m to 
f exclusive truth. This has led to a deinstitutionalization of religious belief. 
Beckford maintains that 
This is all congruent with Berger's depiction of secularization as 'the 
process by which sectors of society and culture are removed from the 
dominationofreligiousinstitutionsand symbols' (1967, p. 107) and 
as the production of increasing numbers of people 'who look upon the 
world and their own lives without the benefit of religious 
interpretations' (1967, p. 108). Berger held that the problem of 
meaninglessness was intimately related to the effects of 
seculadzation on the level of social structures and consciousness · 
alike. (Beckford, 1989, pp. 89 - 90). 
Berger seems to take a far less anguished attitude towards modernity in his 
latest work A Far Glory (1992). This would seem to be, in part, due to the 
change in emphasis in his work from the effects of secularization upon, 
contemporary society, to the effects of plurality and pluralization upon 
contemporary society and within the consciousness of those who inhabit 
that world. The pluralistic situation evident in contemporary society is one 
which, for Berger, enables truth to reappear for "Truth resists 
relativization." (Berger, 1992, p. 77). This attitude perhaps aligns Berger 
. 
more closely with his friend, fellow sociologist, and former co,:anthor, 
;;. 
· Thomas Luckmann. Luckmann has argued that "religion is a structural as 
well as a cultural feature of all societies and that its 'invisible' functions are · 
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no less important for not being empirically available for observation and 
measurement." (Beckford, 1989, p. 102). These 'invisible' factors associated 
with religion, in Luckmann's opinion, include the increasingly private nature 
of religious conviction and expression centering on such themes as self~ 
actualization, family, and nationalism. (Luckmann, 1967). Luckmann 
maintains that inrlividuals need frameworks and systems of thought 
through which they can interpret their various experiences of life, and which 
enable them to make decisions about living. These frameworks and 
· systems usually involve reference to ideas and concepts which stretch 
beyond anything an individual can see. In order to integrate one's 
experiences, Ludemann says, individuals refer to o:r use 'systems of 
meaning.' These systems of meaning run like a thread through the various 
sectors of a person's life, giving it coherence. Until relatively recently, there 
was, to a large extent, throughout the Western world, one 'system of 
meaning' which permeated every aspect of life. The Christian religion was 
the dominant source of this integrating system. It described the nature of 
the world and the nature of realit>.1 itself, and prescribed how one should live 
both in society and in one's personal life. In contemporary Western culture, 
the Christian 'world-view' no longer has a monopoly. To some extent, 
everyone has the opportunity of choosing their own systems of meaning 
and deciding for themselves what will have ultimate significance for them -
at least in the private spheres of life. The public world has its own 
particular values and ways of operating which are built around economic 
factors, efficiency, productivity, and orderly management. In the private 
world, individuaJs can choose their own 'world-views' and values, and these 
systems are seen as personal and private. (Luckmann, 1967). 
Berger is alw,iys at pains not to overstate his theological position regardhg. 
100 
. ,, 
,_-. 
,, 
;·i:.· ·-. I' ·' ,i ,, 
the possibility of apprehending the supernatural (Berger's 'signals of 
transcendence' as he outlined in his book: A Rumour of Aggels; supra vide, 
pp. 74 -88) through empirical phenomena. For Berger 
Imputing transcendence to these 'gestures' .is in itself an act of faith. 
The theological procedure advocated in that book is 'inductive,' not in 
the sense of modern scientific method, but in the sense of taking 
ordinary human experience as its starting point ... Using more 
conventional Christian language, I might say that my approach is 
'sacramental'~ an apprehension of God's presence 'in, with am1. under 
the elements of common human experience - though this usage 
might invite yet other misunderstandings. (Berger, in Hunter and 
Ainlay, 1986, pp. 231 - 232). 
Berger, in A Far Glory, seems to share Luckmann's opinion regarding the 
positive merits ,if plurality, for the pluralism of contemporary society opens 
up the opportunity for the "individual in ques't. of religious truth to make 
something of a fresh start." (Berger, 1992, p. 127). It would seem that, for 
Berger, there is now 'The Problem of Ecclesial Bewnging .' (Berger, 1992, pp. 
169 - 190). This problem of ecclesial belonging comes about, in part, 
through the above mentioned processes of rationalization, secularization 
and pluralization. More particularly, however, this problem is a result of the 
cUITent state of the Christian denominations themselves. Here, Berger 
draws upon such antecedents as Kierkegaard who held Christendom in 
contempt, and Barth who considered that the church was always where 
God's judgement (or 'krisis') particularly applied and who was also influenced 
by the writings of Kierkegaard, and Bonhoeffer who did not see the 'world' as 
being evil but that it was here, in the reality of the world, that the reality of 
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God was realized. Berger is willing to concede that the institution of the 
church at least fulfils the sociological functions of 
to all 
providing a frame of reference so as to make the tradition available 
No miracles for us, no angels, no transfigurations;just a glimmering 
of transcendence in a transitory and usually solitary experience of 
wonder, a remem'bered sunset or a redeeming smile, or a long ago 
moment in church, or a passage in something once read. Needless to 
say, such experiences are much more fugitive and effervescent than 
the mighty visitations experienced by a Paul or a Teresa. To make 
sense of them, literally to be able to remember them, we require a 
frame of reference that typically derives from the institutionalized 
tradition in which we are rooted (by birth or a later event). (Berger, 
1992, pp. 171 -172); 
and providing a plausibility structure for religious beliefs 
In this, once more, religion is not unique; every belief requires such 
social support. One can only say that religion is particularly in need 
ofit because of the extra-urdinary and (for most people) meta-
empirical character of its affirmations .... I have never seen the gods; 
if I am to affirm my belief in them, I very much need social support 
for this beliof. (Berger, 1992, p. 172). 
However, Berger goes on to say '·that "religious institutions not only 
preserve, hand on, and make plausible a particular religious experience; 
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they also, as it were, domesticate it." (Berger, 1992, p. 173). The question 
this raises for Berger is "Why belong at all?" For Berger 
"Denominationalism has created an etiquetre of considerable insipidness" 
(Berger, 1992, p. 180) on the one hand; and on the other an unbelievable 
fanaticism. "It seems to me one of the great challenges of the pluralist 
situation to find a way of religious existence that rejects both these 
alternatives." (Berger, 1992, p. 181). 
Because of Berger's unpreparedness to assent to either extreme of 
exclusivist religious positions on the one hand and the secular relativists on 
:, the other, Berger sees himself as something of a 'lone believer' (Berger, 
1992, pp. 81-104), and as belonging to a 'cognitive minority' (Berger, 1967, 
pp. 184 - 185; Berger, 1969, pp. 6 - 7). This is consistent with his analysis of 
the deinstitutionalization of meaning, and the demonopolization of religious 
traditions within modem society (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, p. 81; supra 
vide, pp. 48 - 49). 
There is no authoritative answer that applies to everyone. Again 
using traditional Protestant language, one might say that ecclesial 
belonging is a matter of "vocation," of what one may singularly be 
call.ed upon to do. Vocations differ. It may be a legitimate Christian 
vocation to continue in one's original community, even if that 
community has become a very unappealing place. It may be equally 
legitimate to change one's ecclesial affiliation in a direction that 
promises less frustration. One may be called to inner emigration and 
one may also be called (as Simone Weil eloquently argued for herself) 
'" to the role of a solitary outsider. Vocations are relative by definition. 
This relativization does indeed have a peculiar, perhaps disturbing 
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affinity with the sociological realities of modern pluralism. (Berger, 
1992, p. 190) . 
The ever present pluritlism of modern societies (moral, sexual, religious, and 
cultural) does present important theological challenges. Berger may not 
have all the answers, but he sees the questions more clearly than most . 
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Berger's Ethical agd Political Position: 
With respect to the spheres of ethics and politics within contemporary 
society Berger applies the same balanct\d outlook to such concerns as he 
does with respect to religion in contemporary society. Berger's sociological 
concern (which is coloured, as mentioned above, by his theological concern; 
particularly as influenced by Bonhoeffer) is to create a tolerant and even 
compassionate society (Berger, 1963, pp. 183 - 185). This concern for 
humanity led Berger to become interested in such political concerns as 
Third World development and modernization (Berger, 1969, pp. x - xi). Here 
again it is possible to detect the influence of Bonhoeffer upon Berger as 
issues of religion in contemporary society impinge upon political concerns. 
That is, to borrow from Bonhoeffer's terminology, whilst being concerned 
witb 'ultimate' reality, Berger is compelled to address issues of'penultimate' 
reality for this is the reality of everyday life. 
Just as Berger is content to respect any religious system which values 
humanity and gives to Ls adherents the freedom to choose and to debate 
issues within tbat tradition, and also to enter into dialogue witb other 
traditions so that "Such dialogue becomes a common journey toward truth." 
(Berger, 1992, p. 77). So also is Berger content to respect political and 
ethical systems which respect the rights of the individual. Berger is 
concerned to see tbat justice be done, and tbat justice be seen to be done 
(Berger, 1992, pp. 209 • 211). It is this pragmatic way of seeing reality 
which led Mechling to refer to Berger as 'The Jamesian Berger.' (Mechling, 
in Hunter and Ainlay, 1986, pp. 197 • 220). Berger, whilst not being thrilled 
by this categorization (Berger, in Hunter and Ainlay, 1986, pp. 233 • 234), 
does nonetheless agree with O'Leary (O'Leary, in Hunter and Ainlay, 1986, 
105 
pp. 179 - 196) that there is a very real, and pragmatic, relationship 
between his (that is, Berger's) sociology of knowledge and politics. 
I believe that he is correct in seeing the notion of'cognitive respect' 
as a crucial link between the two spheres. Within the frame of 
reference of the sociology of knowledge, and indeed of sociology in 
general, 'cognitive respect' means that one takes with utmost 
seriousness the meanings held by living human beings in any given 
situation. This, again, is what Vers"tehen is all about; of course, this is 
a methodological, not a moral, principle. It links up, though, with a 
particular stance in politics. It is conservative, at least in the 
(Burkean) sense of respecting the common values and traditions of 
people, and of rejecting all notions of'raising the consciousness' of 
people or of otherwise pretending to know better than they what is 
good for them. This conservatism, of course, also predisposes one 
toward democracy as a form of government and toward the market 
economy. This notion of'cognitive respect' is a unifying thread in my 
work on development strategies, on 'mediating structures' and on 
human rights. It is also at the root of my criticisms of socialism and 
of the pretensions of intellectuals, the 'New Class' and other putative 
'vanguards of the people.' (Berger, in Hunter and Ainlay, 1986, p. 
233). 
Berger owes, in part, a debt to Kant with respect to the relation between 
politics and religion. This entails a demarcation between purely 
authoritative assertions of God in the spirit of dialectical theology, and the 
purely rational proof of God in the spirit of natural theology. Therefore there 
is reference made, not to theoretical orthodoxy, hut to practical 
106 
,,. 
,, 
, 
(orthopraxis) knowledge of God, manifested in one's actions; in a similar way 
to Kant's categorica! imperative 
Act so that the maxim of thy will can always at the same time hold 
good as a principle of universal legislation. 
God is then understood as the condition for the possibility of humanity's 
moral autonomy. So that for Kant and others the Enlightenment became 
the liberation from self-imposed tutelage; and therefore the legitimation of 
the questioning of (any) authority. This might be represented schematically 
in a simple way as follows: 
PRE - ENI.IGHTENMENT : ignorance, intolerance, parochialism 
POST - ENLIGHTENMENT : democracy, liberalism, nationalism 
(as opposed to tutelage to colonial powers, or religious authorities). 
The pragmatic Berger has a preference for the Western democratic system 
simply because he believes that it works 
' If one believes in the rights of the individual, then one must believe 
in the superiority of the Western legal system that has uniquely 
institutionalized these rights. If one holds a moral preference for 
people having enough to eat as against people starving, then one 
must deem Western-derived capitalism a superior way of arranging 
the economy. None of these positions preclude criticisms of one's own 
society and of its institutions any more than they preclude respect 
for other cultures; but they presuppose that one's experience has 
yielded some measure of truth. This is why the ch.rrge of "cultural 
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imperialism" is often facile: Any affirmation of truth is "imperialistic" 
since it must presuppose its superiority over the corresponding 
affirmation of error. (Berger, 1992, pp. 71 - 72). 
Here Berger finds himself in a bind. Berger's analysis of modernity concerns 
itself with some central concepts and propositions, such as: 
Modernization -Though oriented and perhaps even inspired by 
classical social theory, Berger approaches the relation between 
culture and social change from a unique angle, one derived from the 
sociology of knowledge. His pre-eminent concern is with the effects 
of modernization upon human consciousness. (Wuthnow, in 
Wuthnow, Hunter, Bergesen, and Kurzweil, 1984, pp. 54 - 55; 
Beckford, 1989, pp. 89 - 90); 
Technology - Technology, bureaucracy and pluralism, then, are the 
dominant institutional features of modernity. All, Berger maintains, 
have distinct effects on human consciousness. (Wuthnow, in 
Wuthnow, Hunter, Bergesen, andKurzweil, 1984, p. 56); 
Bureaucracy - Bureaucracy ... has distinct consequences for the 
world view of modernity. Among these are the perceptions that 
society is organizable and manageable as a system, that the various 
elements of experience are capable of being ordered into a taxonomic 
structure where the affairs of daily life are to be carried out in a 
regular and predictable fashion, that human rights are related to 
bureaucratically identifiable rights. (Wuthnow, in Wuthnow, Hunter, 
Bergesen, and Kurzweil, 1984, p. 56); 
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Functional Rationality • Underlying both technological production 
and bureaucratic organization and thus also carried over into the 
totality of experience is a basic functional rationality. This is not an 
intellectualization of the world but rather 'the imposition of rational 
controls over the material universe, over social relations and finally 
over the self' (1973: 202). (Wuthnow, in Wuthnow, Hunter, 
Bergesen, and Kurzweil, 1984, p. 57); and 
Pluralism· Pluralism, as Berger contends, manifests itself in 
several ways in modern societies. Its most important form is socio-
cultural pluralism· the pluralism of symbolic universes where 
values, morality, and belief systems of a sometimes very different 
character are placed in a position of having to co-exist. Historically, 
this kind of pluralism was carried by urbanization, but at present it 
is also carried by mass communications and public education. 
(Wutbnow, in Wuthnow ,Hunter, Bergesen, and Kurzweil, 1984, p. 
57). 
Furthermore, Berger rejects any Marxist or neo-Marxist theories of Third 
World underdevelopment, simply because he believes this analysis to be 
empirically false. 
Thus most Liberation Theologians believe that Third World 
underdevelopment is caused by capitalism; that the Third World is 
poor because the First World is rich· that is, our wealth depends on 
their poverty; and, most important in terms of political implication, 
that socialism is the way out of Third World poverty. It is my opinion, 
based not on some ethical theorizing but on the reading of the 
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evidence, that every one of these bP.!iefs is empirically false. (Berger, 
1969, p. 152). 
This, then, is Berger's bind; he believes, because of empirical experience, 
that capitalism is a 'morally safer bet' (Berger, 1986, p. 12) than Marxist 
political systems. That economic rationality, as displayed by capitalism, is 
one of the major causes of the disintegration of traditional societies, which 
Berger is aware of, leaves Bergey having to assert a 'hardnosed utopianism,' 
which, in the final analysis, as Berger admits, fails. 
Berger (1986) later acknowledged that this attempt to have the 
best of both worlds ('hardnosed utopianism') was a failure. The even· 
handed approach therefore yielded to a one-sided debunking of 
socialism and an equally partial eulogy of the benefits of development 
in the capitalist mode. The ethical dilemmas associated with Third 
World development are not so confidently resolved, but capitalism is 
described as on balance 'the morally safer bet' (1986, p. 12). 
(Beckford, 1989, pp. 94 - 95). 
Berger's humanistic concern compels him to maintain that 'penultimate' 
events find "their ultimate significance ... in a reality that transcends them 
and that transcends the empirical coordinates of human existence." 
(Berger, 1969, p. 181). Again, it is immediately apparent the great influence 
which Bonhoeffer has had upon Berger. (supra vide, pp. 19 • 20). The moral 
and political issues of modern society, which were of such grave concern for 
Bonhoeffer, must also be confronted in Berger's opinion, for the religious 
perspective is one which values and cares for the human. (Berger, 1969, p. 
181). Truth, for Berger, is essentially a religious concept. (Berger, 1969, p. 
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182). And only by honestly searching for truth and justice will "the 
redeeming gestures of love, hope~ and compassion ... [be] reiterated in 
human experience." (Berger, 1969, p. 106). 
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Berger's Discussion of Religious Meaning antl Modernity: 
Having expk,rad some of the issues which stem from Berger's analysis of 
moder.nity, it &ow remains to examine the central problem of this thesis 
(apart from the purpose of providing an overview an~ examination of 
Berger's thought), namely: In spite of the collapse of traditional theodicies 
Berger maintains that religion still has a place to play in human culture. 
'l'his thesis describes and outlines the ways in which Berger explores what 
aspects of religious meaning are compatible with modernity. This is the 
problem oflegitimating a theodicy in Post-Enlightenment society. 
Berger's claim that "Men are congenitslly compelled to impose a meaningful 
order upon reality." (Berger, 1967, p. 22) highlights the need people have for 
a meaningful existence. However 
secularization frustrates deeply grounded human aspirations -
most important among these, the aspiration to exist in a meaningful 
and ultimately hopeful cosmos ... There are, of course, secular 
'theodicies,' and they clearly work for some people. It appears, 
however, that they are much weaker than the religious 'theodicies' in 
offering both meaning and consolation to individuals in pain, sorrow 
and doubt. (Berger, 1977, p. 79). 
For "It is not happiness that theodicy primarily provides, but meaning." 
(Berger, 1967, p. 58). This meaning is required by society, and individuals 
within society, by virtue of the anomic forces which disrupt, or even 
destroy, the established order. 
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So as to legitimate a meaningful, contemporary theodicy Berger suggests 
various signals of transcendence which are "phenomena that are to be 
found within the domain of our 'natural' reality but that appear to point 
beyond thatreality."(Berger, 1969, p. 59;supravide, pp. 74-88). 
Berger, in bis latest work (A Far Glory), says this about the signals of 
transcendence 
I have long thought that the signals we can find in ordinary, 
everyday life are of decisive importance: The recurring urge of human 
beings to find meaningful order in the world, from the overarching 
edifices constructed by great minds to the assurance that a mother 
gives her frightened child; the redemptive experiences of play and 
humour; the ineradicable capacity to hope; the overwhelming 
conviction that certain deeds of inhumanity merit absolute 
condemnation, and the contrary conviction as to the absolute 
goodness of certain actions of humanity; the sometimes searing 
experience of beauty, be it in nature or the works of man; and many 
others one could easily enumerate. Each of these, though quite 
ordinary in many case'3 and almost never perceived as supernatural, 
point toward a reality that lies beyond the ordinary: The order my 
mind imposes on the world intends an order that was there before my 
mind began to work on it. If my game or my joke can temporarily 
supersede the tragic dimensions of the human condition, I can 
envisage the possibility that tragedy is not necessarily the last or 
most important thing one can say about that condition. If I can hope 
even in the face of death, then I can at least entertain the thought 
that death may not be the last word about my life. And so on. 
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These experiences clearly do not unambiguously or compellingly 
testify to transcendence. Each of them can be amply explained in 
secular terms that bracket or exclude transcendence. Order may 
indeed be the product of human minds, illld nothing else; outthere,in 
the end, may be nothing but meaningless chance or chaos. My 
playing and my joking may be useful ways to escape for a few 
moments from the tragedy of being a vulnerable and mortal being, 
but in the end, the joke may be on me. I may hope all I want, but all 
my hopes will finally be dashed not only by my own death but by the 
eventual destruction of everyone and everything in whom or in which 
I have invested hope. To see in these experiences signposts toward 
transcendence, therefore, is in itself a decision of faith. There must be 
no illusion about this, no manoeuvre to bring in the hoary proofs for 
the existence of God by the back do01. But the faith in these signals 
is not baseless, nor is it a mental ac"tegratuit. It takes my own 
experience seriously and dares to suppose that what this experience 
intends is not a lie. (Berger, 1992, pp. 139 • 140). 
As mentioned previously (supra uide, p. 69), the construction of meaning in 
contemporary society needs an ability to cope with complexity, it needs to 
be reasonable, as well as contemporary (to cope with tlie plurality in 
modem society), and it is on the way (that is, not given to closure). 
Therefore any contemporary theodicy, or system of meaning, must be able 
to be historically concerned (that is, conscious of its origins and open to the 
future), empirical (that is, open to scrutiny and review), inductive (that is, 
dealing with concrete reality, not abstract thc-ory), and concerned with 
people's lived experience. The signals of transcendence allow for the 
legitimation of this private, deinstitutionalized religion; that is, they 
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legitimate a mearungful theodicy for contemporary humanity. T, ,is 
theodicy, which is able to accommodate the wider view current in modern 
society provided by the ecological movement, interaction between the 
various religious traditions, the feminist movement, t.'ie reality of multi-
culturalism, and the resulting pluralism from the above factol'S, can provide 
some basis for a meaningful and authentic existence in contemporary 
society. The signals of transcendence are able to correlate people's lived 
experience (theil' 'natw-al reality') to a reality which is "in, with and under" 
that natural reality (Berger, 1992, p. 155; supravide, pp. 81, 86 - 87). The 
influence of Bonhoeffer, who debunked the notion of there being two 
separate realities in existence (one divine, the other worldly), on Berger is 
again apparent. (supra vide, pp. 19 - 20). 
Berger's contribution to sociology, and to the sociology of religion in 
particular, involves an innovative methodological synthesis which enables 
Berg,,r to utilize the sociology of religion in a way which addresses the 
situation in contemporary Western society (Beckford, 1989, pp. 170 -172). 
To effectively address the place of religion in contemporary society, as 
outlined by Beckford, Berger utilizes an ~nductive' theological methodology 
whereby human experience 'correlates' with another reality; namely, a 
supernatural reality. This inductive process of 'correlation' is seen by 
Berger to be reasonable (Berger, 1992, p. 155; Berger, 1969, p. 53). 
However 
Nothing that has been said here makes the crisis brought on by 
moral pluralism disappear. Just as religious certainty is hard to 
come by in the pluralistic age, so is moral certainty ... In the earlier 
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discussion of religious experience I emphasized the element of trust -
trust, that is, in my own experience ... What I must tlc then is 
undertake the previously mentioned prise de conscience - to recollect 
what I know, and have faith that what I know is truth. This is not a 
formula for immunity against the corrosive effects of relativity. If 
relativity is a stormy sea of uncertainties, this faith does not 
magically make the waters recede so that we can march through 
them on a dry path. What it does do is give us courage to set sail on 
om· little boat, with the hope that, by God's grace, we will reach the 
other shore without drowning. (Berger, 1992, p. 211). 
In the final analysis, for Berger 
The choice is finally between a closed world or a world with windows 
on transcendence. It goes without saying that the latter is more 
hopeful. However, this does not make it less reasonable: 
Hopelessness does not have a superior epistemological status. 
Indeed, one might say that, philosophically, it is more reasonable to 
hope than to despair. (Berger, 1992, p. 142). 
This, then, is the role which Berger's signals of transcendence serve: to 
provide hope in life, trust in one's experience and in the future, and courage 
to live a full and authentic existence. As such Berger's signals of 
transcendence do legitimate a theodicy which does provide meaning in Post-
Enlightenment society. 
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CHAPTER V:CONCLUSION 
Berger has written so much that any assessment of his work will suffer 
from not being able to review all of his output. This thesis has sought to 
provide an overview and examination of the central aspects of Berger's 
enormous output. It is possible to detect an evolution in the development of 
Berger's thought and work. One example of this is the W8Y in which Berger 
has addressed many of the issues which were of concern to the Neo· 
Orthodox Protestant theologians such as Barth and Bonhoeffer, having 
been so strongly influenced by them at an early stage, and then moving 
away from such a theological position because of his later sociological 
convictions (1967, pp. 179 • 185; supra vide, pp. 16 • 22). The influence of 
Bonhoeffer, particularly in the realms of ethics and politics, however, 
remains a significant influence upon Berger to this day (supra vide, pp. 105 
-111). Another example of the evolution of Berger's thought and work is in 
the areas of secularization and pluralism (supra uide, pp. 96 - 104). 
Berger's methodology enables him to address issues of 'proto·typical' 
concern, the issues of everyday, lived existence. As discussed previously, 
this ha.s led some to accuse Berger of methodological simplicity (supra vide, 
pp. 90 • 95). This, however, is Berger's concern; that is, to address the 
human situation as it is lived. Berger is vitally concerned with the lived 
experience of humanity. His work is phenomenological and empirical "in the 
sense that it is concerned with human experience in everyday life. Its task 
is (most generally) to describe human experience as it is lived and not as it 
is theorized about· to account for social reality from the point of view of the 
actors involved." (Wuthnow, in Wuthnow, Hunter, Bergesen, and Kurzweil, 
1984, p. 73). 
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Berger is concerned with the phenomenon of everyday life and, apart from 
his use of phenomenological methodology, offers a form of 
philosophical/theological anthropology which is not only re.freshing in its 
accessibility but also of profound significance with respect to the 
implications it has for life and for the study of sociology, theology, 
philosophy, history, and anthropology (Berger, 1969, pp. ix - x). Berger (and 
Lucl,mann) provide an important re-evaluation of the sociology of 
knowledge with respect to its understanding of the social construction of 
reality. The issues they raise far exceed the boundaries of sociology alone 
(they are concerned with all that passes as 'knowledge' within society) and, 
as such, their work is of great historical (with its use of the history of ideas) 
and philosophical (with its discussion of 'reality') importance too. Their 
discussion of the relationship between objective and subjective aspects of 
society reconciles previously contrary view poir,ts. This dialectic is central 
to their understan<ling of society and of the place and role of humanity 
within society. "The point is that society sets limits to the organism, as the 
organism sets limits to society." (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, p.182). 
Whilst concerned at a theoretical level, it is, nonetheless, Berger and 
Luckmann's intention that the se>ciology of knowledge be relevant to the 
lived experience of humanity; and that it lead to a humanizing of sociological 
theory. 
This oqject is society as part of the human world, made by men, 
inhabited by men, and, in turn, malting men, in an ongoing historical 
process. It is not the least fruit of humanistic sociology that it 
reawal<ens our wonder at this astonishing phenomenon. (Berger and 
Luckmann, 1966, p. 189). 
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For Berger, as a sociologist and a Christian, the choice of this methodology 
has taken the form of a 'vocation,' (Berger, 1992, p. 190) in so far as he 
achievP,S a congruency between his life, his profession, and the methodology 
which he employs within that profession. Because of the methodology of his 
approach Berger finds himself in a 'cognitive minority,' (Berger, 1967, pp. 
184 • 185; Berger, 1.969, pp. 6 • 7; supra vide, pp. 76, 91, 103). Berger finds 
himself in such a situation because he suggests that it is possible to hold a 
socio-historical world-view consistent with the sociology of knowledge, and 
also assent to the place of the supernatural within that world-view. Such a 
person holding such a view is on the outside of socially legitimated views on 
religion, society, and philosophy: religion, because of the way revelation is 
central to 'orthodox' belief; society, because so many people within 
contemporary society are dis-enfranchized with such an orthodox view of 
religion in particular, and with organized religion in general; and philosophy, 
because the prevailing intellectual 'orthodoxy' does not admit to the place of 
the supernatural. It is into this unenviable situation that Berger sets forth 
the place and validity of the supernatural within contemporary society. 
Berger attempts to be entirely honest and not to overstate his theological 
position regarding the possibility of apprehending the supernatural 
(Berger's 'signals of transcendence' as he outlined in his book: A Rumour of 
Angels; supra vide, pp. 74 • 88) through empirical phenomena. Berger is 
content to admit that he does not have all the answers (s1<pra vide, p. 95). 
Therefore, Berger is unable to provide an over-arching system of meaning in 
the contemporary situation. This, however, is not a weakness or fault in his 
work but, rathe,-, is an honest attempt to legitimate a theodicy which does 
provide meaning in Post-Enlightenment society. 
'· 
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Rather than providing J!!l (or one) over-arching system of meaning, Berger 
allows for choice to be made between varying and sometimes contradictory 
systems of meaning (Berger, 1963, p. 68), so that meaning may be made 
from the necessity of having to choose between systems of meaning, and 
thereby the construction of meaning takes place (Berger, 1992, pp. 87 • 89; 
supra vide, pp. 96 • 104). To achieve this Berger draws upon a wide range of 
thinkers and disciplines in the formulation of his thought and work. Whilst 
this creates an eclectic and, at times, repetitive approach (much of the 
material in The Sacred Canopy is simply a re-working of material from The 
Social Construction of Reality; which forms a large part of A Far Glory too) 
to the material Berger examines, it remains to be said that the conclusions 
which Berger reaches &.re independent of others and, as mentioned above, 
whilst these conclusions have put Berger outside various intellectual 
'orthodoxies,' he remains an innovative, creative, and astute commentator 
on contemporary society. 
Though Berger's thought and work are eclectic and, at times, repetitive, he 
provides a refreshing analysis of contemporary society, and his suggestions 
as to the construction of meaning in contemporary society does legitimate a 
theodicy (or theodicies) which does provide meaning in Post-Enlightenment 
society. 
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GLOSSARY 
Alienation • is the process whereby the dialectical relationship between the 
individual and their world is lost to consciousness. The individual "forgets" 
that this world was, and continues to be, co-produced by their actions. 
(Berger, 1967, p. 85). That is, ol:!iectivation is reified. 
Anomy (Anomie) - tbe absence of a nomos, or nomic order. The concept of 
anomie was first developed by Durkheim (Suicide, 1951, Glencoe, Ill., Free 
Press). Berger uses tbe Anglicized spelling. (Berger, 1967, p. 21). 
Bureaucracy~ "Bureaucracy, carried by a large number of institutions in 
contemporary society, but particularly by the modern state, also has 
distinct consequences for tbe world view of modernity. Among these are tbe 
perceptions that society is organizable and manageable as a system, that 
the various elements of experience are capable of being ordered into a 
taxonomic structure where the affait'S of daily life are to be c&rried out in a 
regular and predictable fashion, that human rights are related to 
bureaucratically identifiable rights. As with technological production, th.is 
orientation is ori_ginally derived from the various encounters the individual 
has with bureaucratic structures but is carried over into an overall 
perception of the world." (Wutbnow, in Wuthnow, Hunter, Bergesen, and 
Kurzweil, 1984, p. 56). 
Cosmization -derived from Eliade (Cosmos and History, 1959, New York, 
Harper, p. 10 ff.). The socially established nomos appears as a microcosmic 
reflection of the universe. 
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De-Institutionalization • pluralistic competition between truth claims of 
various sub-universes of meaning may weaken the claims a universe of 
meaning has to absolute 'Truth.' (Berger and Lucl<mann, 1966, p. 86). 
Secularization and phiralism contribute to this situation. 
Existentialism • despite the diversity, certain basic characteristics bearing 
on philosophy and ethics are noteworthy. Existentialist literature offers 
valuable phenomenological insight into the human condition. Stress has 
been placed on 
a) subjective individuality, or personal involvement, as distinguished from 
being merely theoretical and detached, in making moral choices. Sartre 
says, "existence precedes essence," subjectivity must be the starting point 
for genuine understanding. This characteristic is thereforo set alongside 
another 
b) a strong opposition to 'systems' which, lil<e Hegel's, tend to fit human 
existence into abstract or pre-conceived moulds. At its best Existentialism 
urges each individual to discover for themselves what their own 
'authenticity' as a person requires of them. It calls for setting aside the 
rationalization of behaviour and mere conformity to the 'crowd.' 
A third claim, made in its most dramatic form by the atheistic 
Existentialists, is that 
c) hum.an existence is basically absurd (Sartre, Camus); that humans have 
been thrown into a world that lacks cosmic meaning (Heidegger). 
Nietzsche's proclamation through Zarathustra of the death of God helped to 
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mould this perspective. Life is not simply paradoxical, as in Kierkegaard's 
view; life is absurd in the fundr.u.u~ntal sense that there are no rational, 
theological, or philosophical categories for explaining it. Hu.mans rr.ust 
accept the reality of their 'bei,~g-towards-death' (Heidegger) without 
Kierkegaard's hope in God who meets the person who reaches out in faith 
from their 'sickness unto death.' 
The fourth, and basic, contention of Existentialism is that 
d) each person possesses the inescapable freedom to choose, which ic the 
fundamental fact of being human and the sin qun non for a qualitative 
existence. All Existentialists agree that the quality of life is up to the 
individual to determine. 
Existentialism perhaps lends itself to extravagances, but in the bands of its 
saner practitioners, these are avoided. Indeed, one might say that it saves 
us from still wilder extravagances, and especially the extravagance of 
trying to construct a philosophy without first scrutinizing in all its 
accessible dimensions the locus in which all philosophizing takes place - our 
own human experience and existence. 
The 'Classical' world view held that fixed, immutable principles evidenced in 
the world gave rise to eternal, unchanging principles. Whereas now the 
modern world view gives credence to the lived E,nstential experience of the 
moral agent; and the context in which that person lives out their life. This 
historir.ally conscious world view avoids the traps into which the classical 
world view fell by supposing that there is "an unchanging body of clearly 
formulated precepts, based on a supposedly unchanging nature." 
123 
(Macquarrie, 1977, p. 506). 
Existential philosophers seek to gain philosophical perspective through 
describing and evaluating the human condition. The fundamental claim of 
Existentialism is that humans are only truly human to the extent that they 
discover their own nature (essence) through decisive action (their 
'existence'), as opposed to receiving some prescribed nature of existence. 
Each person, so Existentialism contends, possesaes the inescapable 
freedom to choose, which is the fundamental fad of being human and the 
sin qua non for a qualitative existence. Existentialists assert that the 
quality of life is up to the individual to determine. 
A contemporary, historically conscious, world view must, of necessity, be 
able to enter into dialogue with, and be relevant to, the world, and the issues 
of that world, in which it finds itself. This contemporary world view takes 
seriously the locus in which all meaning is constructed - our own human 
experience and existence. That is, by using ar~ empirical, inductive method 
which is concerned with historical particulars this world view takes 
seriously the lived experience of humans. (Macquarrie, 1973; Macquarrie, 
1980). 
Externalization - the outpouring of human being into the world. (Berger, 
1967, p. 4). 
Functional Rationality - "Underlying both technological production and 
bureaucratic organization and thus also carried over into the totality of 
experience is a basic functional rationality. This is not an intellectualization 
of the world but rather 'the imposition of rational controls over the material 
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universe, over social relations and finally over the self' (1973: 202)." 
(Wuthnow, in Wuthnow, Hunter, Bergesen, and Kurzweil, 1984, p. 57). 
Hermeneutics - is the theory and method of interpreting meaningful human 
action. (Abercrombie, Hill, and Turner, 1988, p. 112). 
Humanism - a concern with humanity rather than with God or nature is the 
central tenet of humanism. Humanist Marxist sociology is that which takes 
humanity, rather than social structure, as its central focus. (Abercrombie, 
Hill, and Turner, 1988, p. 116). For Berger, a humanistic perspective to 
sociological inquiry is vital in that it enables freedom to he realized in 
society. (Berger, 1963, p. 199; Berger, 1966, p. 189). 
Ideology - when a particular definition of reality comes to be attached to a 
concrete power interest it may be called an ideology. (Berger and 
Luckmann, 1966, p. 123). 
Institutionalization - the collective externalization of society, which has 
about it an objective reality (or givenness), as a result of the habitualized 
actions and reciprocal typifications of society. ( Berger and Luckmann, 
1966, pp. 53 - 54). 
Internalization - the structures of the externaVobjective world are 
transformed into structures of the subjective consciousness. (Berger, 1967, 
p. 4). 
Legitimation - the term legitimation is derived from Weber and refers to 
socially ol\jectivated 'knowledge' that serves to explain and justify the social 
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order. Put differently, legitimations are answers to any questions about the 
'why' of institutional arrangements. Legitimations are mostly pre· 
theoretical in character. (Berger, 1967, pp. 29 - 31). 
Liberal Protestant Theology - developed into an anti-dogmatic and 
humanitarian reconstruction of the Christian iaith. Liberalism, which came 
into being in the Nineteenth Century, may be defined as the holding of 
liberal opinions in politics or theology. F.D. Schleiermacher (1768 - 1834) 
was a leading figure within Liberal Protestant theologians. Schleiermacher 
defined religion as 'a sense and taste fo,- the infinite,' or as the feeling of 
absolute dependence. He also contended that religion was based on intuition 
and feeling and that it was ind.opendent of all dogma, he saw its highest 
experience in a sensation of union with the infinite. Schleiermacher held 
that the variety of forms which the feeling of absolute dependence takes in 
different individuals and societies accounts for the diversity of religions, of 
which Christianity is the highest, though not the only true one. (Cross and 
Linngstone, 1984, pp. 821, 1243 -1244). Berger has a high regard for the 
work of the Liberal Protestant theologians, and Schleiermacher in 
particular. Berger uses a process of'induction' which "involves an attempt 
to uncover and retrieve essential experiences embodied in the religious 
tradition. It is both empirical and comparative, in that it takes all religious 
experience seriously in its search for transcendent reality. Friedrich 
Schleiermacher achieves paradigmatic status relative to this approuch." 
(Gaede, in Hunter and Ainlay, 1986, p. 170). Berger refers to the 
'Protestantization' of religious groups which is a result of the increasing 
secularization and pluralism within modem society. Berger is , nonetheless, 
an admirer of the honesty which Protestantism (particularly such 
theologians as Schleiermacher) has maintained in its interaction with 
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modernity. • It was Protestantism that first underwent the onslaught of 
secularization; Protestantism that first adapted itself to societies in which 
several faiths existed on equal terms, the pluralism that may be regarded 
as a twin phenomenon of secularization, and it was Protestant theology 
that the cognitive challenges to traditional supernaturalism were first met 
and fought through." (Berger, 1969, p. 17). 
It is in this tradition that Berger sets forth his thesis on the relevance of the 
supernatural in contemporary society. Not in a spirit of accommodation7 or 
reduction, or translation, but by developing an inductive theology ( or 
theodicy, or system of meaning; Berger, 1969, p. 22). 
Mru:ginal Situations - situations which drive a person close to or beyond the 
boundaries of the order that determines their routine, everyday existence. 
(Berger, 1967, p. 23). 
Modernization - "Though oriented and perhaps even inspired by classical 
social theory, Berger approaches the relation between culture and social 
change from a unique angle, one derived from the sociology of knowledge. 
His pre-eminent concern is with the effects of modernization upon human 
consciousness. These effects, of course, are wide-ranging, influencing core 
assumptions about everyday life, and experience of time and temporality, 
the formation and experience of the self, the interpretation of symbolic 
universe of meaning (religion in particular), and the nature of political 
reality. Berger, in his characteristically sweeping and comprehensive 
fashion, cO'vers all of these areas. 
Of all his intellectual forbears, it is chiefly from Weber that Berger derives 
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his orientation. As with Weber, the infrastructure of modernization is 
rationality, especially as it is embodied in the economic and political 
apparatus of society. In this he sharply distinguishes himself from Marxist 
theory on the subject, a theoretical perspective that explains the 
peculiarity of modern institutions almost entirely in terms of the peculiarity 
of modern capitalism. For Berger, functional rationality is the determining 
variable in modern society, yet it is not simply a functional rationality 
which spontaneously emerges and is diffused in society. Of principal 
importance in the origin, evolution, and transmission of modernization is the 
rationalized, indeed technologized, economy and its related institutions. Of 
critical importance in the inner-dynamics of modernization are the 
rationalized political institutions of society, particularly the modern 
bureaucratic state." (Wuthnow, in Wuthnow, Hunter, Bergesen, and 
Kurzweil, 1984, pp. 54 - 55). 
Neo-Orthodoxy - a title applied to the theological principies of Karl Barth 
and his followers (supra uide, pp. 16 - 22). Nee-Orthodoxy is also called 
dialectical theology on the ground that, in distinction from the dogmatic 
method of ecclee,iastical orthodP:.y, which treats God as a concrete Object 
(uia dogmatica), and the negative principles of many mystics, which forbid 
all positive affirnldtions about God (uia negativa), it finds the truth in a 
dialectic ai;prehension of God which transcends the 'Yes' and the 'No' of the 
other methods (uia dialectica). Its object is to preserve the Absolute of faith 
from every formulation in cut-and-dried expressions. (Cross and 
Livingstone, 1984, p. 399). 
Nomization - the propensity for order in society, as opposed to anomy. 
(Berger, 1969, pp. 60 - 64). 
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Nomo~ - a meaningful order which is imposed upon the discrete experiences 
andmeaningsofinilividuals. (Berger, 1967, p. 19). 
Objectivation ~ the produ~t of externalization confronts its original 
producers as a facticity external to and other than themselves. (Berger, 
1967, p. 4). 
Phenomenolo,,"l'. - provides a significant methodological tool for Berger. 
Berger adopts (a..,d adapts) this methodology from the sociologist, Alfred 
Schutz (1899 - 1959) who was concerned to explore the 'world-taken-for-
granted'. This is the self evident world ofthe'here-and-now' which demands 
one's immediate attention. (confer Schutz,A, tr. Walsh, G., and Lehnert, F. 
[1967], The Phenomenology of the Social World, Ill.: Evanston). In the 
sociology of knowledge, phenomenologists have concentrated on the way in 
which commonsense knowledge about society feeds back, through social 
action, into the moulding of society itself. (Bullock, Stallybrass, and 
Trombley, 1988, p. 645). Phenomenology, as employed by Berger, requires 
the 'brad<eting' of personal preferences and prejudices so as to be able to 
investigate the "doings of men." (Berger, 1963, p. 29). Phenomenology refers 
to the 'study of phenomena'; the study of what appears or what may be 
observed (similar to Kant's 'Phenomena;' supra vide, p. 26). The use of 
phenomenology requires that the investigator utilizes academic discipline 
and imaginative empathy. This requires the investigator to make an 
attempt to appropriate and understand what a particular phencmenon 
might involve for those people who are directly engaged with it. 
Phenomenology is a kind of thinking whi<;h guides the investigator back 
from theoretical abstraction to the reality of the lived experience. A 
phenomenologist asks the question "what is it like to have a certain 
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experience?" In examining the qualities of the experience the investigator 
can then arrive at the essence of the experience. The phenomenological 
method is an inductive, descriptive research method. The task of the 
method is to investigate and describe all phenomena, including the human 
expe,rience, in the way these phenomena appear in their fullest breadth and 
depth. To ensure that the phenomenon is investigated as it truly appears a 
necessary criterion is that the researcher must approach the suluect and 
the experience with an open mind, accepting whatever data are given with 
no pre-conceived expectations. No data are ignored because of conflicts with 
theoretical frameworks or operational definitions. The concern of the 
phenomenological researcher is to understand both the cognitive subjective 
perspective of the person who has the experience and the effect that 
perspective has ou the lived experience of that individual. (Kentish, 1992, 
pp. 42 • 48). 
Pluralism· rival definitions of reality compete with each other for a share of 
the 'market.' (Be -ger, 1967, pp. 135 · 137). "Pluralism, as Berger contends, 
manifests itself in several ways in modern societies. Its most important 
form ie. socio-cultural pluralism· the pluralism of symbolic universes where 
valu,.!s, morality, and belief systems of a sometimes very different 
character are placed in a position of having to co-exist. Historically, this 
kind of pluralism was carried by urbanization, but at present it is also 
carried by mass communications and public education." (Wuthnow, in 
Wuthnow ,Hunter, Bergesen, and Kurzweil, 1984, p. 57). 
Pluralization • because of the cultural plurality involved in society where 
pluralism occurs, members of that society are faced with cl,.oosing between 
equally valid options for life (be they religious, philosophical, or 'life.style). 
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This subjective process of choice in a pluralistic situation is called by Berger 
'pluralization.' (Berger, 1992, p. 67). "Modernity is a gigantic movement from 
fate to c/wice in the human condition." (Berger, 1992, p. 89). Humans are 
"compelled to choose." (Berger, 1992, p. 89). 
Poat-Enlightenment Society · is marked by an increasing secularization 
(the process whereby sectors of society and culture are removed from the 
domination of religious institutions and symbols; stemming from Rene 
Descartes' [1596 · 1650] maxim "Cogito, ergo sum." ["I think, therefore I 
run."], which displaced the prevalent theocentricism with a solidly based 
anthropocentricism) and rationalism (stemming from Immanuel Kant's 
[1724 -1804] distinction between 'Phenomena' and 'Noumena' ['things in 
themselves']. Kant maintains that we cannot prove the noumenal, we can 
only prove the phenomenal). 
This increase in secularization and rationalism undermined the Pre-
Enlightenment metaphysic with its traditional arguments for the existence 
of God and the authority of the Church and the Bible (confer Chadwick, 
1990). 
Post-Modernism - society has moved from the pre • Enlightenment, to the 
Enlightenment, to the Post - Enlightenment (modern), to the Post -
Modernist (where there is a dis-confirmation of all ideology, particularly 
religious ideology [theodicy] due to the secularization of the European mind 
[confer Chadwick, 1990]). 
Post - Modernism may be seen as a retreat into irrationality; a coming to 
terms with a world where God is dead (the modern metaphysic), and where 
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the author is also dead. The Post· Modernist world view reflects the change 
in world view from post • Newtonian physics (dealing with a closed, 
predictable system I structure... a Post • Enlightenment view) to 
Einsteinian physics (dealing with an open ended, unpredictable system I 
structure ... the Post · Modernist view). 
Post - Modernism resists closure, yet also affirms that we cannot live 
without trying to make sense of reality (Marshall, 1992, pp. 192 - 3). Post -
Modernism gives up absolute Truths; instead it works with local and 
provisional truths (Marshall, 1992, p. 3). Post · Modernism is empirical; it 
does not have a transcendental identity (Marshall, 1992, p. 4). Post -
Modernism involves a critical questioning of power and values, but also 
affirms the need for these (Marshall, 1992, pp. 4 - 5). Post · Modernism 
involves "an incredulity toward metanarratives.' (Marshall, 1992, p. 6; 
Ktlng, 1980, p. 504). "The post - Modernist movement resists totaJ;,ations, 
absolute Identity, absolute Truths. It does, however, believe in the use -
value of identities and local and contingent truths.' (Marshall, 1992, p. 6). 
Post- Modernism claims that words, ideas, creeds, and structures can 
' become idols (Marshall, 1992, p. 18 ); and that "the twentieth - century 
Occidental subject ls still a mixture of the mediaeval 'I' believe; the 
Cartesian 'r think; the Romantic 'I' feel; as well as the existential 'I' choose; 
the Freudian 'I' dream, and so forth.' (Marohall, 1992, p. 86). Furthermore, 
Post-Modernism maintains that history is not teleological, not linear, which 
privileges both the 'origin' and the subject of consciousness who interprets, 
and thus controls, the past from the perspective of the present. (Marshall, 
1992, p. 157). 
Post - Modernism corresponds w Berger's notion of the 'public' and the 
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'private' spheres. The public sphere is over· institutionalized (dealing as it 
does with such 'social' concepts as sincerity and honour), whereas the 
private sphere is under - (or de-) institutionalized (dealing as it does with 
more personal concepts as authenticity and dignity; Berger and Luckmann, 
1966, p. 81). 
Eagleton maintains that the antecedents of modern secular society are: 
science7 democracy, rationalism, and economic individualism; and that 
religion has failed to provide a coherent nomos ("a coherent cement") given 
the changes that have taken place within society since the late nineteenth 
century (industrialism, scientific discovery, and social change). This gave 
rise to the Romantic movement, and to the rise of English Literature (which 
fills the emotional and experiential needs of people; that is, it provides a 
coherent nomos, a socially constructed reality). (Eagleton, 1986, pp. 22 -23 
ff.). For Post-Modernists it is language which produces meaning. (Eagleton, 
1986, p. 60 ). 
Projection • the concept of projection was first developed by Fauerbach. 
Both Marx and Nietzsche derived it from Feuerbach. It was the 
Nietzschean derivation that became important for Freud. Berger (and 
Luclcm.ann) use the term 'externalization' to convey a similar concept. 
(Berger, 1967, p. 180). 
Reification - is the apprehension of human phenomena as if they were 
things, that is, in non-human or possibly supra-human terms. (Berger and 
Luckmann, 1966, p. 89). 
Religion - a human enterprise in so far as this is how it manifests itself as 
an empirical phenomenon. Within this definition the question as to whether 
133 
religion may also be something more than that remains bracketed, as, of 
course, it must be in any attempt at scientific understanding. (Berger, 
1967, p. 190). Therefore, religion is to be understood as a human projection, 
grounded in specific infrastructures of human history. ( Berger, 1967, p. 
180). 
Secularization • the process by which sectors of society and culture are 
removed from the domination of religious institutions and symbols. (Berger, 
1967, p. 107). 
_Signals of Transcendence · are phenomena that are to be found within the 
domain of our "natural" reality but that appear to point beyond that reality. 
(Berger, 1969, p. 59). These signals of transcendence are constituted by 
'prototypical human gestures,' which are certain reiterated acts and 
experiences that appear to express essential aspects of humanities' being. 
(Berger, 1969, p. 59). 
Sociology • may be defined as the study of the bases of social membership. 
More technically, sociology is the analysis of the structure of social 
relationships as constituted by social interaction, but no definition is 
entirely satisfactory because of the diversity of perspectives which is 
characteristic of the modern discipline. (Abercrombie, Hill, and Turner, 
1988, p. 232). 
Significant contributions have been made to the discipline by 
Karl Marx (1818 · 1883) • all social structure was class structure, 
and the history of all societies was the history of class struggles. In his 
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f.indamental methodology, Marx argued that social existence determines 
consciousness (s.n important insight for the sociology of knowledge), and 
that ideology ('ideas serving as weapons for social interests') is merely a 
superstructure ('the world produced by human activity'), economic relations 
being the substructure ('human activity'). (Bullock, Stallybrass, and 
Trombley, 1988, p. 793; Berger and Luckmann, 1966, pp. 5 • 6). 
Max Weber (1864 • 1920) • held that sociology would concern itself 
with the meaning of social action and ,he uniqueness of historical events 
rather thllll with the fruitless search for general laws. (Abercrombie, Hill, 
and Turner, 1988, p. 233); and 
Emile Durkheim (1858 - 1917) • exhibited a far more confident view 
of the achievements of sociology, claiming that it had shown how certain 
moral and legal institutions and religious beliefs were the same in a wide 
variety of societies, and that this uniformity was the best proof that the 
social realm was subject to universal laws. (Abercrombie, Hill, and Turner, 
1988, p. 233). 
The synthesis ofDurkheimian (society as objective reality) and Weberian 
(society as subjective reality) view points achieved by Berger allows for a 
balance between the sociological reification of objective social reality and 
the idealism of subjective meanings. "Society is a dialectic phenomenon in 
that it is a human product, and nothing but a human product, that yet 
continuously acts back upon its producer." (Berger, 1967, p. 3). 
Sociology of Knowledge - "The need for a 'sociology of knowledge' is thus 
already given with the observable differences between societies in terms of 
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what is taken for grnnted as 'knowledge' in them." (Berger and luckmann, 
1966, p. 3). 
Whilst the term 'Sociology ofKnowledge' ('Wissenssoziologie') was coined by 
the philosopher Max Scheler in the 1920's, Berger and Luckmann suggest 
three other contributing factors in the development of the sociology of 
knowledge. First is the work of Karl Marx from whom the sociology of 
knowledge derives its root proposition "that man's consciousness is 
determined by his social being." (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, p. 5). From 
Marx comes also such concepts as 'ideology' - "ideas serving as weapons for 
social interests."; 'false consciousness' - "thought that is alienated from the 
real social being of the think.er."; 'substructure' - "human activity."; and 
'superstructure' - "the world produced by that activity." (Berger and 
Luckmann, 1966, p. 6). Second, "one can say that the sociology of 
knowledge represents a specific application of what Nietzsche aptly called 
the 'art of mistrust.m (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, p. 7). The third factor 
Berger and Luckmann cite as being influential in the development of the 
sociology of knowledge is the development of historicism in which the 
"dominant theme here was an overarching sense of the relativity of all 
perspectives on human events, that is, of the inevitable historicity of 
human thought." (Berger and Luckmann, 1966, p. 7). 
Sociology of Religion - in sociology, there are broadly two approaches to the 
definition of religion. The first, following Durkheim, defines religion in terms 
of its social functions: religion is a system of beliefs and rituals with 
reference to the sacred which binds people together into social groups. In 
this sense, some sociologists have extended. tha notion of religion to include 
nationalism. This recent perspective is criticized for being too inclusive, 
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since almost any public activity - football, for example - may have 
integrative effects for social groups. The second approach, following Weber, 
defines religion as any set of coherent answers to human existential 
dilemmas - birth, sickness 01· death - which make the world meaningful. In 
this sense, religion is the human response to those things which concern us 
ultimately. The implication of this definition is that all human beings are 
religious, since we are all faced by the existential problems of disease, aging 
and death. (Abercrombie, Hill, and Turner, 1988, p. 207). Weber's definition 
of religion is similar to that of Luckmann's, who equates religion with 
symbolic self-transcendence. Thus everything genuinely human is ipso facto 
religious. (Berger, 1967, pp.175 -177; Luckmann, 1967). 
The synthesis of Durkheimian (society as objective reality) and Weberian 
(society as subjective reality) view points achieved by Berger allows for a 
balance between the sociological reification of objective social reality and 
the idealism of subjective meanings. "Society is a dialectic phenomenon in 
that it is a human product, and nothing but a human product, that yet 
continuously acts back upon its producer." (Berger, 1967, p. 3). 
Technology - "Technology, bureaucracy and pluralism, then, are the 
dominant institutional features of modernity . .All, Berger maintains, have 
distinct effects on human consciousness. Truer to the argument, each of 
them has a corollary at the level of consciousness. Together they allow one 
to speak of modem consciousness or, in turn, the symbolic universe of 
modernity. True to Weberian form, Berger maintains that technological 
production was initially carried in the West by industrial capitalism though 
this economic structure is presently only one among other possibilities." 
(Wutbnow, in Wuthnow, Hunter, Bergesen, and Kurzweil, 1984, p. 56). 
137 
Theodicy - theodicies traditionally sought to provide an explanation 
(religious legitimation) of how to live through anomic phenomena, and are 
typically explained in terms of the nomos ('sacred canopy') established in 
the society in question. Theodicies were often seen as solutions to individual 
suffering (a solution to the problem of evil). Berger sets theodicies within the 
broader context of making meaning. As such a contemporary theodicy 
needs to include such factors as the interrelationship between self, others, 
the world, and the transcendent so as to provide some basis for an 
authentic and meaningful existence (confer Berger, 1967, pp. 53 - 80). 
Verstehen - is usually translated as 'understanding.' This concept has 
formed part of a critique of positivist or naturalist sociology. It is argued 
that sociology should not analyze human action from 'the outside' by 
copying the methods of the natural sciences. Instead, sociology should 
recognize the meanings people give to their actions. (Abercrombie, Hill, and 
Turner, 1988, p. 265). The term is used to denote understanding from 
within, by means of empathy, intuition, or imagination, as opposed to 
knowledge from without, by means of observation and calculation. The term 
was employed in particular by Weber. (Bullock, Stallybrass, and Trombley, 
1988, p. 894). 
World-taken-for-granted - is derived from Schutz (Collected Papers, Vol. I, 
p. 207 ff.). This is the socially objectivated world which is the commonsense 
world of everyday life. (Berger and Luclanann, 1966. p. 16). 
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